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From
Merciless Indian Savages to Illegal Combatants: The Historical
background of the War on Terror and Iraq's Occupation
by Anthony
J. Hall
Author and Founding Coordinator
of Globalization Studies
at the University of Lethbridge (established 2002)
The Spanish War then created opportunities
for acquiring such stations, far out in the Pacific as well
as in the Caribbean. It placed in America’s grasp territories
which, if not seized, could go to potential rivals. And it
offered a chance for Protestant Christianity (also a species,
by Social Darwinist canons) to score a gain in its struggle
for survival against Catholicism and heathenism. Ernest
R. May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay, 1967
As columns of US tanks rolled into the centre of Baghdad in
April 2003, the resurgent military mastery of the American
empire was on global display. In seizing control of Iraq from
the regime of Saddam Hussein, the US government injected its
unique brand of high-tech martial power into the heartland
of ancient Mesopotomia. This legendary domain between the
Tigris and Euphrates waterways, a site of some of humanity’s
earliest breakthroughs in agriculture, irrigation, literacy,
and civic formation, has long been viewed as one of Western
civilization’s primary seedbeds. There were many rich
ironies, therefore, in the extension of the so-called War
on Terrorism into Iraq, a country situated near the cultural
headwaters of the civilizational stream now surging through
the United States in its current role as the “the West’s”
chief agency of global domination.
The extension of the US government’s War on Terrorism
to the goal of “regime change” in Iraq placed
a new light on the old myth that the West’s destiny
in global history is synonymous with the destiny of civilization
itself. As presently structured, the West’s most tangible
instruments of global pre-eminence lie in the power of the
US government and in the closely related operations of the
world’s largest commercial corporations In 1960 retiring
US president Dwight D. Eisenhower identified the most instrumental
agency at the hub of this mix of institutions as the militaryindustrial
complex. The production of ever-more-lethal and sophisticated
weapons of mass destruction constitutes this technopoly’s
most advanced frontiers of innovation and control, linking
the destiny of all living beings on our shared planet. Among
its many global functions, this military-industrial technopoly
has become one of capitalism’s most high-octane stimulants
as well as its primary police force.1
The intertwined complex of US public institutions and corporate
leviathans that currently dominates global capitalism was
spawned most
prolifically in the process which saw the United States emerge
from Western Europe’s imperial colonization of the Western
Hemisphere. It was spawned with particular fecundity in the
expansion of the United States to continental proportions.
This expansion was characterized by the conquest of many Indigenous
peoples and their lands. Before their ingestion by the United
States, these North American lands and their Aboriginal inhabitants
had been colonized by the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Spain,
Russia, and, of course, Great Britain. Central to this process
of annexation through conquest was the transformation of huge
expanses of the earth’s most diversified, bounteous,
and hospitable territory into titled private property whose
ownership was vested not only in human persons but also in
those corporate polities that first acquired their legal personality
as “natural persons” in the United States. To
understand the most aggressive motifs of globalization at
the present time, there is no more telling history to explore,
ponder, narrate, and debate than the process which saw the
world’s sole remaining superpower emerge from European
imperialism generally and from British imperialism more specifically.
The surge of US territorial acquisition and transformation
in North America gave rise to one of the West’s most
heavily dramatized and romanticized sagas of frontier conquest.
A few common themes emerged from the rationales used to justify
the seizure by the United States not only of its western frontiers
but of the global fate of the West itself. These justifications
for conquest and domination have been remarkably consistent
with the rationales once dispensed in explaining the imperial
annexations and impositions of European empires. Such rationales
have been permeated by a view of human history as a linear
progression marking the ascent of civilization over the alleged
savagery of those peoples who have slowed or impeded Western
dominance. Only rarely has the story of the West’s rise
to global pre-eminence been presented in more complex and
nuanced narratives, describing all manner of mergers, clashes,
and accommodations among civilizations.
As the architects of the American empire have increasingly
gazed towards the Arab-speaking and Muslim worlds as the next
frontiers of their social, military, political, and commercial
re-engineering, it has become essential to understand the
persistent power of the West’s master parable. The key
to that parable is the concept of all human interaction as
a struggle to advance civilization’s conquest of savagery
and barbarism. In mounting its War on Terrorism in the wake
of the September 11, 2001, tragedies, the regime of George
W. Bush drew heavily on the evangelical impulse of the West’s
old civilizing mission. The US president and his advisers
renewed the justification once popularized to explain both
European imperialism and Manifest Destiny.
Where the United States emerged in its early years as both
opponent and agent of European imperialism, Manifest Destiny
seemed to invest the American nation’s expansionist
energies with a sense of providential mission and sanction.
Manifest Destiny was initially directed at extinguishing the
Old World titles of Indigenous peoples as well as the Old
World claims of the European powers that had previously colonized
the Western Hemisphere. In the Cold War era the Red menace
driving the build-up of the American war machine was no longer
perceived to be Indians and British Red Coats. Instead, the
perceived enemy had been globalized to encompass the real
and imagined threats of international communism. Then, in
the post–September 11 world, the imagery of terrorism
replaced that of savagery and communism as the main explanatory
catch-all to describe the real, illusory, or manufactured
enemies of the American way of life.
In framing the underlying assumptions of the War on Terrorism,
there was virtually no recognition by the government of the
United States of the ironies entailed in mounting such a campaign
in a society born of violent revolt by a heavily armed citizenry
against the sovereign authority of a duly constituted government.
There was virtually no public recognition that the very shape
and workings of Western civilization are inextricably bound
up with the violent overthrow of old orders in the course
of the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the
Russian Revolution. Indeed, without the violence of the American
Civil War, who can say how much longer the institution of
slavery would have been tolerated and accommodated within
the structures of American federalism? In making these observations
I am not implying that there is no need to mobilize against
genuine zealots who constitute very real menaces to the integrity
of public order and the physical safety of civilian populations.
What I am alleging, however, is that, without some substantial
public reckoning with how to negotiate the complex of connections
linking power and coercion, both outside and inside the institutions
of sovereign governments and their corporate progeny, the
War on Terrorism is in danger of becoming little more than
a self-serving cover for the worst sorts of oligarchies. Already
this unorthodox “war” has enabled many opportunists
lodged in corrupt and discredited regimes to demonize their
critics, repress their foes, and entrench their own power
as though its monopoly under their own control was some final,
utopian outcome of history fulfilled.
The War on Terrorism has deep roots in American history that
cut far beneath the events of September 11. While the labels
of the demonized other may have changed over time, the imagined
attributes of the stigmatized foes of the American Dream have
remained remarkably consistent since the era of the founding
of the United States. In their very first act of self-justification,
the founders carved out in 1776 a special category to encompass
a class of humanity deemed bereft of inalienable rights, a
class of people thought to embody such potential for unpredictable
violence and anarchy that they were placed outside the assertions
of equal rights proclaimed as the raison d’être
of the revolutionary republic. In an internal contradiction
too long neglected by scholars and teachers of American history,
this class of humanity was characterized as predators to be
excluded and extinguished in building the edifice of universal
liberty. The War on Terrorism gave renewed force and legitimacy
to prejudices similar to those that once induced the authors
of the Declaration of Independence to refer to the Indigenous
peoples of North America as “merciless Indian savages.”
Their “known rule of warfare,” the founders proclaimed
in the most famous and consequential political manifesto ever
penned, “is an undistinguished destruction of all ages,
sexes, and conditions.”
This identification of Aboriginal Americans with savagery
and with the indiscriminate destruction of people and property
would cut a bloody swath through American history in the rise
of the United States to continental, hemispheric and, ultimately,
global pre-eminence. From the beginning of this ascent, those
distinct peoples who stood in the way of the United States’s
territorial ambitions were dehumanized and criminalized in
the text of the Declaration of Independence. They were collectively
set up as the target of what, in today’s terms, might
be characterized as a campaign of territorial, commercial,
and political aggrandizement disguised behind the cover of
a self-righteous war on terrorism. They were collectively
subjected to a regime of racial and moral profiling that has
seen the lawless violence once directed at “merciless
Indian savages” extended, to name only a few, to Aboriginal
Hawaiians, indigenous Philippinos, nationalist Vietnamese,
socialist Central and South Americans, revolutionary Cubans,
and displaced Palestinians. Who knows how many other groups
on the
next frontiers of American power in both the Arab-speaking
and Muslim worlds will find themselves demonized because of
the arbitrary judgments made by those in charge of an endless
War on Terrorism? Who knows who will be the next to be stripped
of their inherent right of self-defence, let alone of their
rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Who
knows what government, what people, what nationality will
next be denied all access to anything approaching due process
in the international community, all in the name of the superpower’s
self-declared imperative of pre-emptive attack? Who knows
how many groups or individuals within the imperial heartland
of the informal American empire will be denied all civil and
political rights because it is claimed they represent a danger
of “an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes
and conditions?”
In the spring of 2003 the world watched, fixated, as the
governments of the United States and its British imperial
parent defied the international authority of the United Nations.
Without the approval of the UN’s Security Council, the
sole agency on the planet with the international authority
to sanction lawful warfare, the former and current superpowers
joined forces to install an Iraqi government more in keeping
with their interests. The decision of the governments of the
Unites States and Britain to defy the jurisdiction of the
United Nations brought to the surface a range of new schisms
dividing the West and, indeed, the entire global community.
The resulting controversy revealed a profound difference of
opinion among governments, politicians, and organized bodies
of citizens within most countries. At the core of this disagreement
was the question: Will the planet henceforth be governed through
the exercise of some sort of democratic rule of law, centred,
however imperfectly and precariously, at the United Nations?
Or does the military and commercial power of the United States
render the government of that superpower as the highest authority,
as the ultimate court of final resort in the making of world
order?
When that question seemed to be answered, for the time being
at least, by the raw assertion of political and military will
entailed in the US-led invasion of Iraq, the unwritten, unregulated,
and informal nature of the American empire came under increasingly
close scrutiny throughout the global community. How much longer,
it was asked, could the United States claim the power and
privileges of its dominant role in global finance, global
geopolitics, and global control of weapons of mass destruction
without bearing the costs that have traditionally accompanied
the possession of formal empire? How much longer would the
rest of the world tolerate the overt and covert interventions
in their own domestic affairs by a multifaceted superpower
apparently unconstrained by any rules other than those attending
its own internal calculations of self-interest? At what point
might it become no longer feasible for the United States to
claim all the rights and privileges of a global empire without
assuming in more predictable, codified, consistent, and verifiable
ways the large responsibilities that go along with an imperial
role in planetary governance?
In the course of the American military intervention in Iraq,
a reminder of earlier resistance struggles on former frontiers
of American power appeared in the skies above ancient Mesopotamia.
The names given these airborne devices of war served as a
reminder of the historical background of contemporary controversies
over the place and function of international law. They provided
a symbol that most of the great issues to be addressed in
the formulation and enforcement of international law are closely
connected to the unbroken cycles of colonization that continue
to relegate most of the world’s people and peoples to
subordinate status. Along the extended supply lines linking
Baghdad with the strategic shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf
flew tight formations of Apache and Black Hawk helicopters.
The designations attached to these agile mechanisms of military
force were taken from some of the warring opponents of the
United States during earlier phases of its imperial expansion.
By identifying the original resisters of American power with
some of the US military’s most efficient killing machines,
the superpower demonstrated its knack for cultural appropriation.
It demonstrated its propensity to incorporate the fighting
spirit of Old World Aboriginals into the arsenals and iconography
of its New World empire.
The original Black Hawk led an Aboriginal resistance movement
in 1832 in the Illinois area. A group of pro-American Winnebego
men eventually captured the besieged freedom fighter. They
handed over their captive to the top US officials at Prairie
du Chien, a post that retained its distinct character from
its earlier days as an important fur-trade emporium in both
French and British imperial Canada. Black Hawk’s incarceration
can be seen as the final pre-emption by the United States
of the sovereign aspirations of the Indian Confederacy. This
legendary confederation of First Nations had extended its
commercial ties with the Montreal-based traders into a military
alliance with the British imperial government during the War
of 1812. The Indian Confederacy’s aim in allying itself
with the British Army in North America was to achieve for
its citizens sovereign recognition of an unextinguishable
Aboriginal dominion in the heart of North America. In seeking
a permanent national polity with fixed borders in their own
ancestral hemisphere, the Indian Confederacy mounted the most
concerted Aboriginal challenge ever to the expansionist policies
of the United States. With the quelling of the Aboriginal
resistance led by Black Hawk, a seasoned veteran on the British
side in the War of 1812, the US government was, in a sense,
mopping up the military remnants of Tecumseh’s once-formidable
Indian Confederacy.
After incarcerating Black Hawk for a short time, the American
War Department decided to take its prize captive on a tour
of major US cities in the nation’s more heavily populated
regions. The object of the exercise was to impress on Black
Hawk and his oldest son, who also joined the tour, that it
was futile for Aboriginal Americans to resist the power and
might of the United States. Much to the surprise of the event’s
organizers, Black Hawk and his entourage created a minor sensation.
Everywhere they went, Black Hawk and his son met with intense
curiosity from large numbers of animated onlookers. The newspapers
quickly joined and amplified the phenomenon, extending to
Black Hawk a new kind of celebrity status. As this episode
and others like it demonstrated, the American public were
fascinated by defeated Aboriginal warriors. Ironically, in
attempting to protect their own ancestral portions of the
American homeland, these Indian patriots had contributed to
the mythology of the seizure of the American West as a classic
martial drama highlighting the hard-won character of civilization’s
conquest over doomed savagery.
In the years ahead there would be many variations on the
themes of resistance, conquest, and celebrity in the glamorized
myth making surrounding the westward movement of the American
frontier. At Little Bighorn in Montana Territory in 1876,
for instance, a well-armed Indian fighting force led by Crazy
Horse and Sitting Bull beat the US Seventh Cavalry of General
George Custer. Custer’s military carelessness was partly
attributable to his desire to parlay a major victory over
Indians into winning the keys to the White House. In attempting
to climb through military ranks to the ultimate prize of the
US presidency, Custer had before him the example of Andrew
Jackson and William Henry Harrison. Both were decorated Indian
fighters who had shot to the top job in the United States
largely through the fame they had garnered in leading frontier
assaults portrayed and celebrated as part of America’s
benighted conquest of a dark and savage continent.
The setback for the US Army at Little Bighorn proved there
could be significant military reversals in the course of Western
civilization’s onslaught on Indigenous peoples. The
strange fate awaiting Sitting Bull was one marker of this
realization. In the years before he was assassinated by a
Siouan police officer in the employment of the US government,
Sitting Bull briefly became the star attraction in Buffalo
Bill Cody’s Wild West Show. This populist extravaganza
laid out the basic plotlines and script for literally hundreds
of Hollywood “Westerns” in the years that followed.
These lucrative early products of the Hollywood Dream Machine
signalled to Americans, and increasingly to a growing global
market as well, the seemingly inevitable course of the United
States’s leadership in vanquishing savagery and securing
the West for civilization’s ascendance. For many decades
the various plots supporting this basic storyline remained
largely unchanged. Only the deep political schisms generated
by the heavy US involvement in the Vietnam War changed the
symbolic geography that had given rise to the stark dichotomies
dramatized in Hollywood Westerns. As the acrimony over Vietnam
shattered a host of naïve certainties on which many pillars
of American nationalism had been built, it became more difficult
to recycle the standard mythology of the moving American frontier
as an unwavering force for civilization’s ascent over
savagery. Some of the new realism proved more ephemeral than
long lasting, however, when the Hollywood presidency of Ronald
Reagan in the 1980s returned the United States to some of
the more primal motifs in the representation of American patriotism.
The warriors for whom the Apache helicopters are named achieved
this distinction by being among the most effective guerrilla
fighters the world has ever known. “They are the tigers
of the human species,” observed Lieutenant-Colonel George
Crook, the officer assigned the job of overseeing the US government’s
military hunt to disarm and to kill or incarcerate the last
of the free Apaches in the Sierra Madre range in the Chihuahua
region of Mexico.2 From that remote mountain bastion the last
of the Apache holdouts conducted a concerted armed resistance
until the mid-1880s against the incursions of the acquisitors
of their ancestral lands in Arizona, New Mexico, and Chihuahua.
At the head of this small array of legendary resisters was
Geronimo.
Geronimo and his group might never have been captured if
Crook had not succeeded in hiring Apache scouts to track down
their relatives in their secret mountain hideaways. In bringing
Indian scouts into the US Army to advance American interests
in the American Indian wars, the US government began to acquire
expertise in the arts and science of divide and conquer. From
Apacheria to India to Iraq and Afghanistan, the strategic
techniques of infiltration, bribery, payoffs, and co-optation
to open, widen, and exploit divisions between and within Aboriginal
groups have been essential to the creation, expansion, and
operation of virtually all imperial systems.
Geronimo gained an enduring reputation that remains securely
lodged in the symbolic mystique of Americana. To this day
the series of pictures taken by C.S. Fly when Geronimo and
his small band of Chiricahua Apache were briefly captured
remains among the best-known and frequently reproduced images
in the history of photography. After posing for Fly, Geronimo
and his group eluded their American captors one more time.
Several months later they were apprehended by a force of 5,000
soldiers. They were immediately deported, along with some
of the now-disfavoured Apache scouts, to a military prison
in Pensacola, Florida. Like Sitting Bull, Geronimo was transformed
by promoters into a popular attraction. He was allowed to
sell autographs and souvenirs to tourists as his part of the
bargain.
In 1904 Theodore Roosevelt invited Geronimo to join in the
US president’s inaugural procession down Pennsylvania
Avenue in Washington, DC. Roosevelt’s goal in selecting
Geronimo was to present the famous old warrior as the “before”
stage in a kind of before-and-after display designed to dramatize
the civilizing ideals of the United States generally and of
US Indian policy specifically. Geronimo was meant to embody
an uncivilized contrast with Quanah Parker, a Comanche rancher
and US magistrate who rode in the parade along with several
graduates of the Carlisle Indian Boarding School. They had
been selected to demonstrate the perceived success of American
methods in elevating former savages to the refined heights
of advanced civilization. Geronimo, however, generated a level
of admiration not extended to Parker. The famed Apache, in
fact, overshadowed all the participants save one. Only President
Roosevelt was more applauded than Geronimo. According to Geronimo’s
biographer Angie Debo, as the onlookers threw their hats in
the air, one is said to have exclaimed, “Hooray for
Geronimo! Public Hero Number 2!”3
During the many years Geronimo spent in the custody of the
American Army at Fort Pickens, Florida, and Fort Still, Oklahoma,
there was always uncertainty about his precise legal status.
This doubt anticipated a similar controversy that arose as
the US government pursued the first stages of its War on Terrorism.
A special prison was established at the American military
base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba to contain Taliban fighters
taken captive in Afghanistan. These soldiers, it was believed,
had close links with al-Qaeda, the group tagged by the Bush
regime as the primary culprits responsible for the September
11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. Just
as the Declaration of Independence placed “merciless
Indian savages” in a kind of constitutional no man’s
land outside the domain of inalienable rights, so the prisoners
at Guantanamo Bay were similarly denuded of all protections
of law and due process. The “detainees” were denied
access to the domestic criminal courts of the United States
and to the international laws and procedures governing the
treatment of prisoners of war.
The parallels between the case of Geronimo and the Guantanamo
Bay incarcerees hint at the existence of many similar comparisons
awaiting timely investigation. A central danger to be addressed
in such investigation is how the US-led War on Terrorism holds
the potential to renew some of the worst abuses of sovereign
authority that Western civilization had seemingly surmounted
in moving beyond European empire building, German fascism,
Soviet totalitarianism, and South African apartheid. What
is at stake is nothing less than the integrity of the rule
of law, a tenuous, incomplete, and imperfect human creation
even at the best of times. The rapid erosion of the rule of
law has been closely connected to renewed patterns of imperial
abuse that have placed some of those on the receiving end
of modern-day colonialism, in a constitutional twilight zone
without access to the remedies of both domestic and international
law. Those so victimized are the contemporary descendants
of the Declaration of Independence’s
“merciless Indian savages.”
It could be argued, in fact, that many of the victims of
the modern-day colonialism are actually worse off than some
of the “savages” and “natives” on
the receiving end of earlier versions of imperial rule. In
the case of the British Empire, for instance, its subjects
had frequently to contend with the alien authority of colonial
institutions. For the most part, however, these institutions
acted on the basis of public acts of the imperial Parliament
and executive orders formulated through political procedures
whose substance could usually be evaluated in the relatively
clear light of day. Though these colonial institutions, along
with the officials who administered them, often performed
in repressive and unjust ways, the oppressive structure of
this system was sufficiently clear that critics, such as Mahatma
Gandhi, could advocate its replacement with indigenous instruments
of home rule.
In the present constellation of global power, no such clarity
exists. In the place of a world divided between imperial powers
and their formal colonies, we now have a planet where the
majority of citizens are effectively dominated by the domestic
political whims, massive military establishment, transnational
banking institutions, and prolific corporate progeny of a
single superpower. There is no transparent constitutional
shape, no tangible rule of law attending the methods of remote-control
governance that have become the modus operandi of the informal
American empire. While the staff of the American State Department,
the Pentagon, the CIA, and its many related agencies might
perform tasks similar to those that once took place in the
British Colonial Office, very little of this activity directed
at controlling events outside the American homeland has any
basis in duly constituted law. The laissez-faire policies
long favoured by American business enterprises, both at home
and in their global operations, have been adopted as the primary
technique of American foreign policy. This term, which seemingly
recognizes the foreign and externalized character of the rest
of the world as a domain lying beyond the jurisdictional scope
of the United States, serves to disguise the global reach
of American power. Underlying this thesis is the observation
that the unilateralism of the United States is far more influential
than the multilateralism of the United Nations in the way
the world is actually governed.
The techniques of this global regime of remote-control governance
are well documented and well known in some circles. They include
forms of financial blackmail regularly practised in the poorer
countries by the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, the covert sponsorship of “regime change,”
such as those US-backed coups known to have taken place in
Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, to name but a few, and the sponsorship
of puppet regimes as epitomized by the royal dynasty in Saudi
Arabia that is the local custodian of US-based oil and gas
interests. Even the most superficial examination of the information
freely available on the background of the September 11 tragedy
reveals that the axis of evil behind the savage attack has
most to do with the politics of the religious fundamentalism
known to thrive among some clients of American power in Saudi
Arabia. Compared with the intensity of the complex interplay
among the religious fundamentalisms that came to dominate
the executive branches of the governments of the United States,
Israel, and Saudi Arabia, the role of the former regimes of
Afghanistan and Iraq in the genesis of international terrorism
was relatively insignificant.
Much of this project is devoted to explaining that the methods
of indirect rule in the informal American empire are not new.
They have evolved over an extended period, but especially
since the devastation of Europe and Japan in the Second World
War. What has changed with the Bush regime’s leadership
of the War on Terrorism is that the US government no longer
hides and obfuscates its unwillingness to abide by the main
tenets of multilateralism and international law. At the core
of the international system as it existed on the eve of September
11 was the principle that the world’s nation-states
are each invested with a sovereign authority that cannot be
legitimately breached. That principle evolved gradually after
its rudimentary outlines were first articulated in 1648 in
the Treaty of Westphalia. In place of the investment of the
powers of self-governance in the agency of nations-states,
the US government now asserts that it possesses a unique imperative
to conduct “regime change,” “pre-emptive
strikes,” and “anticipatory self-defense”
to change the character of governments it does not like. It
makes this assertion based on the conviction, frequently articulated
by the president and his chief law enforcement officer, that
the licence to violate the sovereign authority of foreign
states has come to the United States by divine right.
In May 2003 the Bush White House shortened the name of the
War on Terrorism to the War on Terror. It thereby highlighted
the sharp internal contradiction within the phrase. War is,
after all, a concentrated form of terror. The semantic adjustment
was introduced in the course of a military victory ceremony
on board a US aircraft carrier. “The Battle of Iraq,”
declared President George Bush from the deck of the USS Abraham
Lincoln, “is one victory in the War on Terror that began
on September 11, 2001.”4 Bush’s speech was delivered
amidst an event that was pure American showmanship, a finely
honed spectacle of political propaganda designed to generate
those kinds of images that belong more to the realm of mythology
than to articulate argument. In an era when software, public
relations, and celebrity have become central currencies in
the political economy of mass illusion, the event was a textbook
example of artful advertising for the military-industrial
complex.
It served to help illustrate that the most consequential
conflicts of our time are not those fought with the weaponry
of physical violence but with the means of manipulating public
opinion. The Bush White House seemingly acknowledged this
aspect of contemporary warfare by referring on its website
to “the largest media embed operation on any ship in
naval history.” In this operation, the Lincoln’s
large crew played host to photographers and scribes representing
the world’s major media conglomerates. From Time-Warner
to Disney-ABC, to General Electric-MSNBC, to Westinghouse-CBS,
to Rupert Murdoch’s transnational media empire, these
info-entertainment conglomerates are deeply embedded within
the technopoly of the military-industrial complex. The media
spectacle married elements of the American sci-fi thriller
Independence Day and Leni Riefenstahl’s classic Nazi
propaganda film, Triumph of the Will. In the opening scene
of Triumph, Adolf Hitler is pictured approaching from the
air the Nazi Party rally at Nuremberg in 1934. President Bush
began his big spectacle on board the Abraham Lincoln by touching
down on the vessel’s deck in a S-3B Viking jet. Emblazoned
on the windshield of the aircraft were the words “Commander-In-Chief.”
The US president then emerged in full fighter pilot garb,
invoking the imagery of the dramatic concluding scenes in
Independence Day. In those scenes, an American president leads
a global coalition of armed forces from the cockpit of a small
jet fighter. The aim of this US-led operation is to defend
the planet from the attacks of outer-space aliens.
The Lincoln and its crew provided the American president
with a monumental setting for a stirring depiction of militarism
triumphant. While the producers of the extravaganza borrowed
heavily from the propaganda techniques pioneered by Riefenstahl
and her associates, however, the event was designed to conjure
up the aura of Gettysburg rather than Nuremberg. A central
element of the plan was to locate the ceremony on board the
warship named after the American president who abolished the
institution of slavery in the United States. In 1863 President
Abraham Lincoln went to Gettysburg, the site of the Union’s
most pivotal victory over the slave-owning Confederacy. In
his address, one of the most celebrated orations of any American
president, Lincoln invoked the rhetorical power of some of
the most timeless phrases in the Declaration of Independence.
Lincoln justified federal military actions in the American
Civil War as being dedicated to the proposition that “all
men are created equal.” The sacrifices of the Union
side were dedicated to “a new birth of freedom; and
that government of the people, by the people, and for the
people, shall not perish from the earth.” In 2003 George
Bush attempted in his speech on the Lincoln to draw on the
authority of these same principles. He described US operations
in Iraq as serving the cause of freeing the Iraqi people from
“enslavement.” The purpose of the campaign, Bush
asserted, was to produce a new regime “of, by, and for
the Iraqi people.”
In attempting to link the US objective of regime change in
Iraq to the abolition of slavery throughout the course of
the American Civil War, the Bush administration may have been
responding to an interpretation initially suggested by British
prime minister Tony Blair. Blair first connected the idea
of the War on Terrorism with the abolition movement in a presentation
he delivered at a Labour Party conference soon after the September
11 attacks. Oxford historian Niall Ferguson referred to this
“messianic speech” in the concluding paragraphs
of a survey text he wrote to accompany a BBC television series
on the history of British imperialism. In Blair’s early
response to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington,
Ferguson comments, the British prime minister seemed burdened
under the misapprehension that the United States was born
“in a war against slavery” rather than “in
a war against the British Empire.”5
One of the main themes of Ferguson’s prolific scholarship
is that, on balance, the British Empire brought more advantages
than disadvantages to humanity collectively in the course
of that pluralistic polity’s rise and fall Among the
positive legacies of what Ferguson refers to as “Anglobalization”
are the pervasiveness of English as a worldwide medium of
communication, the elaboration of expansive financial infrastructures
favouring relatively unobstructed and abundant flows of international
commerce, the spread of parliamentary institutions, and the
benefits of the kind of social cohesion which arise from the
ascendance of the rule of law over the rule of force.6 Generally
I agree with this aspect of Ferguson’s work –
and I believe I extend and support his thesis with many of
the arguments I develop in these pages. I maintain, for instance,
that the continuation into the twenty-first century of crown
treaty negotiations with the Indigenous peoples of British
Columbia, Quebec, and the federal territories of Northern
Canada is directly attributable to the persistence of the
imperial rule of law that was retained in what remained of
British North America after the United States achieved sovereign
independence in international law in the Treaty of Paris of
1783. A similar argument could be made about the political
position of Indigenous peoples in Australia, especially in
light of the Australian High Court’s ruling in 1992
that they possess Aboriginal rights that cannot be unilaterally
extinguished through application of the ethnocentric doctrine
of terra nullius – of the strange legal precept that
the land was unpeopled at the onset of European colonization.
Unlike in the remaining crown domain of North America, the
United States has, since 1871, simply denied the existence
of an international law of Aboriginal title, arguing at the
un and elsewhere that it derives its powers over Aboriginal
Americans and their ancestral lands from the act of conquering
them. Between 1776 and 1871 the US government continued the
constitutional inheritance codified for British North America
in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The US government made
and ratified in Congress almost four hundred treaties with
Indigenous peoples in order to gain Aboriginal sanction for
its expansions into Indian Country. Most often, however, these
treaty negotiations took place only after the US military
had conquered Indian fighting forces in the original antecedents
to the Battle of Iraq. The Treaty of Greenville, for instance,
was negotiated by American officials in 1795 only after the
fledgling US Army under General Anthony Wayne achieved a martial
victory over the Indian Confederacy in the Battle of Fallen
Timbers in the Great Lakes region. Before 1795 the fighting
forces of Little Turtle, the leader who led the negotiation
on the Indian side in the making of the Treaty of Greenville,
had twice defeated the American Army in military conflicts
testing disputed claims to rich lands north of the Ohio River.
The graduation years later of Little Turtle’s grandson
from the US Military Academy at West Point serves to suggest
the kind of advantages made available to Aboriginal collaborators
and their families once they changed sides to become instruments
rather than obstacles of US power.
The history of Aboriginal-US relations surrounding the making
of the Treaty of Greenville holds significant clues pointing
towards possible outcomes from the US intervention aimed at
bringing to power a new regime for the governance of Iraq.
This history of US expansion within North America helps also
to illuminate some of the relationships of power affecting
conflicts over jurisdiction in lands and waters claimed simultaneously
by the Israeli state and the Palestinian people. From the
perspective of those parties dealing from the stronger position
of entrenched state power, the prerequisite for successful
treaty negotiations seems to be a decisive demonstration of
armed superiority, making conquest the underlying basis of
any peace settlement. This pattern links the aftermath of
the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 with the aftermath of
the Battle of Iraq in 2003. Both interventions by the US military
established a balance of power conducive to the subsequent
installation of Aboriginal client regimes willing to sanction
the transfer of control over the exploitation of natural resources.
To realize this fundamental objective, the US government
and its proxies can be expected to hold tenaciously in the
future to the position that they possess the prerogative of
conquerors to decide who is or is not eligible to sit on the
other side of the negotiating table. It seems likely that
any new treaties to emerge from such conditions on the superpower’s
imperial frontiers will be more like Indian treaties in the
United States than the constitutional instruments used to
restore national governments in Western Europe and Japan after
the Second World War. Accordingly, any agreement to recognize
new polities in the occupied portions of the Middle East will
probably draw on the legacy of conquest in the American Indian
wars. Those in possession of the instruments of state terror
will attempt to pressure selected representatives of Aboriginal
groups to acknowledge formally that all their rights, titles,
and jurisdictions flowing from their prior possession of the
(s)oil have been extinguished. The other side of this same
coin is the attempt to gain Aboriginal consent for the principle
that the authorities of the newly recognized regime flow from
delegated powers transferred from the stronger to the weaker
parties in treaty agreements. Hence the concept of extinguishing
the Aboriginal rights and titles of Indigenous peoples remains
integral to the continuing expansion of the New World Order
that excluded the merciless Indian savages – in other
words the imagined enemies of civilization – from the
liberties declared universal at the moment of the future superpower’s
revolutionary inception in 1776.
My emphasis on Aboriginal title as an important element in
the concept of universal human rights leads me to support
and amplify Ferguson’s view that the British Empire
invested the process of globalization with many redeeming
features. I am less pleased, however, by his characterizations
of the rise of the United States from a civil war in British
North America to its current status as the planet’s
sole superpower. This weakness in Ferguson’s work reflects
an analytical problem that cuts widely, I believe, across
a broad spectrum of British imperial and American historiography.
The basis of that problem is twofold. One weakness lies in
the failure of most historians to recognize the nature of
so-called “Indian Affairs” as a precedent-setting
continuum of relations establishing underlying paradigms and
patterns for broader complexes of relationships between colonizers
and the colonized. The other weakness lies in the failure
to situate the American Revolution in its broader temporal
context of violent clashes between competing empires, competing
interests, and competing theories of sovereignty.
As I see it, the dates 1754 and 1814 are the most important
temporal bookmarks in framing the duration of the most violent
phase of the more extended American Revolution. The first
date identifies the onset of the Seven Years’ War, when
Great Britain and France tested the power of the military
force backing their overlapping imperial claims. The year
1814 saw the negotiation of the Treaty of Ghent, the agreement
concluding the War of 1812. This war was the last time that
the United States and Great Britain, the present and past
superpowers, clashed in violent confrontation.
Throughout this period from 1754 to 1814 the Confederacy
of Indigenous peoples in the Great Lakes–Ohio Valley
area played a disproportionately large role in determining
the course of imperial history in North America, a saga whose
pivotal effect on global history is now apparent. In conflict
after conflict between colonial antagonists, the Aboriginal
inhabitants of this contested region held the balance of power.
At the core of the contention between Great Britain and France
in the Seven Years’ War, for instance, was the future
of the strategic Aboriginal territories between the watersheds
of the St Lawrence and the Mississippi rivers. Following British
North America’s incorporation of Canada, a disagreement
over the character of Aboriginal rights and titles in the
newly acquired territory was instrumental in expanding the
schism between competing camps of British imperialists in
the genesis of the American Revolution. In the War of 1812
it was the prospect that the citizens of the Indian Confederacy
would achieve international recognition for their sovereign
Aboriginal dominion in the heart of North America which infused
the most profound ideological and geopolitical issues into
that conflict. Prominent among the mobilized military forces
in the War of 1812 was the Liberation Army of the Indian Confederacy.
Under Tecumseh’s inspired leadership, its military campaign
amounted to an Aboriginal and British-backed version of the
first American Revolution. The aim of this unfulfilled War
of Aboriginal Independence – this second American Revolution
– was to secure and hold jurisdictional ground for the
First Nations. Such an outcome, if realized, would have set
an international precedent that might well have moderated
the ethnocentric extremes displayed in future expressions
of European imperialism and American Manifest Destiny.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century these historical
episodes acquire added meanings as the US government weighs
the fate, for
instance, of the Palestinians, the Kurds, and the diverse
peoples arbitrarily grouped together as Iraqis following the
First World War. One obvious place to look for indications
of how these and other similarly oppressed groups will be
treated in the American imperium is to look to the experiences
of Indigenous peoples in North America, especially during
the period when the United States emerged from its British
imperial origins to claim and to colonize its own continental
empire. Indeed, this process holds important keys to better
understanding of many current phenomena, including the propensity
of the American people and government to turn away from any
approaches to global governance that might render the United
States as a subject as well as a maker of international law.
The roots of this pattern go back to the period before the
American Civil War, when the US government rejected any external
intervention into the sovereign authority of the southern
states over the institution of slavery. Similarly, after the
War of 1812, the US government deftly fended off all European
involvement in the Indian wars and Indian removals that took
place in the course of western expansion. This push found
an extension in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. In his most famous
international pronouncement, President James Monroe articulated
the intent of the US government to reserve the entire Western
Hemisphere, save what remained of British North America, essentially
as a colonial hinterland of the imperial United States. One
outcome has been to deny to the largely mestizo populations
of Central and South America their inherent right to elaborate
without US interference their own complex of foreign relations
in the larger global community.
These historical vignettes are suggestive of the genesis
of the near pathological unwillingness of the US government
under President George W. Bush to acknowledge any secular
law or authority on the planet higher than the power vested
in the United States. They provide the contextual setting
for a very consistent line of decision making connecting,
for instance, the failure of the US government to join the
League of Nations, the US refusal between 1948 and 1989 to
ratify the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the unqualified antagonism
of the Bush regime towards any US involvement in the International
Criminal Court. These and numerous other displays of American
unilateralism have emerged in a country forged in the determination
that its western expansion would not be impeded by either
the resistance of Indigenous peoples or the constraints of
imperial and international law.
From these beginnings, the United States and its corporate
progeny have continued to expand in ways that eschew as much
as possible the kind of elaborate constitutionalism that became
an important factor in the evolution of the British Empire
into the most pluralistic polity the world has ever seen.
This nuanced constitutionalism placed a premium on flexible
adaptation to the diversity of peoples, languages, cultures,
and religions within Great Britain’s imperial embrace.
In contrast, the melting-pot liberalism of the United States
has paradoxically made its informal empire far less tolerant
than was the British Empire towards the eclectic character
of subject peoples, but especially in the realm of economics
and religion. The sense of Manifest Destiny permeating the
expansionistic ethos of the United States has long imbued
its version of the civilizing mission with a particularly
strident strain of evangelism, one that has treated the universalization
of capitalism almost as if the goal of commercial conformity
was the product of divine revelation.
Much calculation and cunning has been employed in crafting
the web of power behind the facade which gives the impression
of the superpower’s laissez-faire relations with the
rest of the global community. The development of these relations
outside the constraints of an overarching rule of imperial
law is much less inadvertent than Ferguson indicates in his
proposal that the United States should adopt a global personality
more like that of Great Britain during the height of its imperial
powers. Ferguson misleads his readers in picturing the United
States as though its position in the world is currently similar
to that of Great Britain at the moment when it began to transform
its sphere of influence from an informal to a formal empire.
As the most powerful outgrowth of the world’s most sophisticated
imperial system, the informal American empire is best characterized
as a distillation, rather than an unrefined version, of the
most expansionistic elements of the British Empire. This pattern
is especially clear from my vantage point in Canada. My country
emerges from the position of those in North America who chose
to stay with the British Empire through the course of the
American Revolution and the War of 1812. Since 1776 it has
become increasingly clear that the imperialism of those on
the Tory side of these conflicts was pale compared with the
expansionary zeal of those who transformed the United States
into the world’s powerhouse of commercialism and militarization.
Charles Darwin’s theory of the “survival of the
fittest” meets Wal-Mart and Hiroshima.
In the New York Times, Niall Ferguson encourages his readers
in the United States to move beyond the “tradition of
organized hypocrisy” that prevails “so long as
the American empire dare not speak its own name.” As
part of the transition Ferguson advocates, he proposes that
the best American universities should devote more attention
and resources to cultivating a class of graduates willing
to serve overseas for long periods of time in a US version
of the British colonial service. In tendering this advice,
Ferguson reflects on the importance of his own country’s
system of higher learning, which produced the “Oxbridge-educated,
frock-coated mandarins” that guided the British Empire
from positions deep within the colonial hinterland. “You
simply cannot have an empire,” he writes, “without
imperialists – out there on the spot – to run
it.”7
I expect that Harvard University is as deeply engaged in
the operation of the informal American empire as Oxford University
ever was in the management of the British Empire. Where the
older empire sent most of its colonial agents out from the
metropolis, however, the superpower deploys its system of
higher education mostly by importing students to transform
the offspring of foreign elites into willing agents of American
indirect rule. Advancement of this process has helped build
the careers of many American academics. For instance, Harvard
professor Henry Kissinger began his rise through the ranks
by guiding many foreign students through the assimilative
process aimed at winning them over to collaborate, when they
returned to their home countries, in US-centred networks of
global command, both formal and informal, overt and covert.
This assimilative function was entrenched in Harvard’s
legal foundations since its founding in the seventeenth century.
Like several other Ivy League universities in the former English
colonies of the United States, Harvard’s charter includes
a specific mandate to educate a class of protestant Indian
missionaries equipped on graduation to evangelize their own
Aboriginal groups. A similar assimilative design seems evident
in the decision of the US government to open a space at the
prestigious West Point Military Academy for Little Turtle’s
grandson after the Treaty of Greenville. A cruder version
of the same manipulative pedagogy developed in the training
of Latin American military forces in the murderous arts and
sciences of “counterinsurgency” at the School
of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia.
As Ferguson should realize, the system of higher education
in the United States has long since been recruited into many
instrumental roles in the military-industrial complex that
lies at the core of the informal American empire. Through
the medium of consultant contracts, for instance, scores of
academics have been as thoroughly embedded in the command
structure of the American war machine as those CNN journalists
who made their way to Baghdad inside US Army tanks. President
Dwight D. Eisenhower devoted considerable attention to the
perils of this infiltration of the academy in the speech where
he first warned of the anti-democratic tendencies of the military-industrial
complex. He cautioned that “a government contract becomes
virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity.”
He added: “The prospect of domination of the nation’s
scholars by federal employment, project allocations, and the
power of money is ever present and is to be gravely regarded.
Yet in holding scientific research and discovery in respect,
as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite
danger that public policy could itself become the captive
of a scientific-technological elite.”8 As should be
clear by now, this text comes from outside the community of
embedded academics in the military-industrial complex. Some
of them have indeed substituted curiosity for government contracts,
and the elusive ideal of scholarly objectivity for a chance
to participate in the chain-of-command overseen by America’s
most overtly imperial presidency.
The frequent references by President Bush to the grace of
God as the source of ultimate sanction for US policies has
effectively rendered the world’s most powerful country,
for the time being at least, as a Christian theocracy. The
division between church and state has been whittled away so
that evangelical Protestantism, which has long vied with Enlightenment
rationality for the heart, soul, and mind of America, has
apparently prevailed. The sense of Manifest Destiny, which
historically imbued the expansionistic ethos of the United
States with Christian purpose, has been renewed, this time
with a vengeance on a truly global scale. The old Manifest
Destiny of the United States has been absorbed into the Born
Again evangelism inspiring the unbridled zealotry of the War
on Terrorism. Both currents of conviction and action have
encouraged Americans to see themselves as God’s Chosen
People, assigned by the Creator to build a New Jerusalem on
earth. Both currents of conviction and action draw heavily
on the evangelical precepts that infused European imperialism
with much of its messianic drive. That missionary enterprise
began dramatically in 1493, just as the Christian Crusades
against the peoples of Islam were coming to a close. With
news of the “discoveries” of Christopher Columbus
before him, the pope moved boldly to implement the doctrine
that he was the exclusive instrument of universal power as
Christ’s sole vicar on earth. He did so by investing
the sovereigns of Spain and Portugal with a divinely sanctioned
title to own and to govern the entire Western Hemisphere in
the name of the Christian sovereigns’ duty to elevate
infidel savages to the higher glories of Christian civilization.
Most of this text and of the larger project of which it forms
a part were conceived, researched, and written before the
War on Terrorism began. Very quickly, however, the events
that followed in the wake of September 11 have rendered one
of its key propositions far less controversial: that the United
States forms the metropolitan centre of a larger, more expansive
polity that I choose to call the American empire or, sometimes,
the American empire of private property. An essential dynamic
animating this empire, I argue, was first set in motion when
the United States was formed as an instrument to overcome
British imperialism. The founders created a new kind of indigenous
North American sovereignty for several reasons, including
the objective of creating a more efficient agency of statecraft
for the ingestion and privatization of the continent’s
vast and pluralistic Indian Country.
I first began developing this thesis in studying the Indian
policies of my own country, a polity that absorbed and retained
French-Aboriginal Canada even as it turned away from many
of the principles animating most of the Anglo-Americans in
the American Revolution and in the War of 1812. In both of
these conflicts it was clear that the most zealous Indian
fighters were on the supposedly liberal side of the clashes.
In their Indian wars the founders and developers of the United
States demonstrated attributes that help to clarify the nature
of the dominant thrust in the complex of processes that have
been recently described as globalization.
As I see it, one of the major themes in globalization is
that the so-called decolonization movement, which unfolded
with particular intensity in the 1960s, did not realize the
promises of liberation during the dismantling of the old European
empires. Instead, European imperialism was replaced by the
form of unregulated, superpower hegemony that currently defines
the main outlines of world order. The broad dissatisfaction
with the failure of the decolonization movement to deliver
genuine liberation may be difficult to apprehend from the
perspective of the network of privileged enclaves that presently
guides and exploits the continuing globalization of western
dominance. But for 75 per cent of the world’s population,
the giant class of groups and individuals still sometimes
referred to simply as “natives,” the resentment
mounts daily that the formal structure of empires, colonies,
and subject peoples has not been replaced with a fairer means
of organizing human relationships. We ignore at our peril
this growing frustration with the continuity of colonialism.
Surely the fate of “the West” and of the whole
world does indeed depend on our capacity to formulate an application
of Enlightenment ideals that is more just and progressive
than the division of humanity between a small entitled minority
and a large, disentitled majority.
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