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The Origins
of the War on Terror
Tuesday, October 28 2003 @ 12:51 PM
MST
Contributed by: sthompson
[Ed. note: This is quite a long piece but well worth reading.]
The Origins of the War on Terror:
September 11, 2001 or July 4, 1776(1)
by Anthony J. Hall
Founding Coordinator and Associate Professor of Globalization
Studies
University of Lethbridge
"The Road to Happiness and Glory is Open to Us Too"
based on the forthcoming book: The American Empire
and the Forth World by Anthony J. Hall Founding Coordinator
and Associate Professor of Globalization Studies University
of Lethbridge
In June of 1776 a committee of five members of the Continental
Congress composed the text about to be presented to the world
as the Declaration of Independence. The five included Benjamin
Franklin and John Adams. The main author, however, was Thomas
Jefferson. According to Adams, he urged this role on Jefferson,
arguing, "You are a Virginian and a Virginian ought to
appear at the head of this business." Besides, added
Adams, "You can write ten times better than I can."
(2)
The authors of the Declaration of Independence drew on many
prior expressions of unhappiness with the mother country.
(3)When they finally took on the task of drafting this "American
scripture" the members of the Continental Congress were
responding to the insistence of their backers in the French
government that their aim must be genuine sovereignty rather
than mere reform within the British Empire. The original document
produced by Jefferson and his colleagues was significantly
longer than the final product. Among the subsequently-removed
sections were passages on slavery and an interpretation of
the alleged infringements of the imperial parliament on the
local legislatures in British North America. Similarly, there
are evocative passages in the original drafts outlining the
different results that might have been expected had Great
Britain accepted a "communication of grandeur and freedom."
Together, lamented the authors, "we might have been a
free and great people" if those in imperial government
had not treated the prospect of more equitable relations within
the British Empire as "below their dignity." "The
road to happiness and to glory is open to us too," proclaimed
the draughtsmen. "We will climb it apart from them."
And climb the United States did, from a confederacy of colonies,
to a federal republic, to a transcontinental nation, to a
hemispheric hegemon, to a superpower, to the planet's sole
superpower, or, as some in France and elsewhere have taken
to writing recently, a hyperpower. (5) One of the central
arguments in this paper is that there is more internal consistency
and continuity in this ascent to global influence and power
than has generally been recognized. As indicated by one of
the lost passages from the Declaration of Independence, the
will to expansionism--the will to climb the steep road of
glory and happiness--has been integral to the formation of
the United States from its inception. (6) This will to expansionism
has culminated in the elaboration and consolidation of an
informal global empire which, in some ways, embodies more
selective yet distilled forms of command and control than
the imperial system of Great Britain, a country which retained
and elaborated its imperial culture long after losing most
of its North American colonies.
In initiating this narrative I call attention to the work
of Niall Ferguson as a point of contrast and comparison. Ferguson
has attracted a good deal of attention as a pundit who draws
ingeniously on his historical analysis in order to contribute
to the increasingly intense contemporary debate on the appropriate
role of law, military force, the United Nations and the United
States in the making of world order. In this debate he has
championed the idea that the citizens and government of the
United States should remake their informal empire into a more
formal construction. He wants to see the United States and
its military forces assert more consistently and more systematically
the global benefits of law, order and transnational capitalism
in ways that come closer to the imperial techniques of Great
Britain before the sun finally set on its empire after the
Second World War. (7)
Ferguson is one of those rare historians who has been able
to make a small rupture in the thick wall of alienation separating
most of the public and the media from any sense of self-conscious
engagement in how our perceptions of the past shape the present
and the future. In calling attention to both the continuities
and inconsistencies characterizing the global roles of the
current superpower and its British imperial parent, Ferguson
has performed an especially timely and important public service.
As I see it, however, there are big lapses in the quality
of his analysis linking the British Empire to the less formal
empire of the United States. In failing to notice the importance
in the era of the American Revolution of the more specific
dispute over the treatment of Indigenous peoples, Ferguson
replicates a rather pervasive and entrenched oversight in
much of the historiography describing the USA's emergence
from the British Empire.
The course of this seminal dispute over the status to be
afforded the lives, the Aboriginal lands, and indigenous political
institutions of the Native peoples in North America would
cast a long shadow over the extension of American power to
continental, hemispheric and global dimensions. Thus there
were a number of broad and long-lasting implications that
would flow from the pre-revolutionary conflict among non-Indians
in British North America over what is today referred to in
section 35 of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982, as Aboriginal
and treaty rights. (8)

As I see it, this reference to Aboriginal and treaty rights
in the document that brought an end to Great Britain's active
control over Canada's constitution forms the basis of a juridical
code with broad applications. The juridical principles
of Aboriginal and treaty rights touch on the domestic law
and politics of many countries. They also touch on the genesis
of various forms of international law, codes which some would
like to see elevated to higher status in the ways
the world's citizenry is governed. The phrase, for instance,
has particular relevance for all Commonwealth countries including
Great Britain, for India, for Indonesia, for northern Scandanavia,
and for all African nations south of the Sahara, including
South Africa. Similarly, the phrase has relevance to several
important elements of the legal and political circumstances
animating the United States and all of so-called Latin America.
While all of the nation-states in the Western Hemisphere,
except that of Canada, emerged from rebellions by colonial
populations against the law-making authority of their imperial
governors, the polities which emerged from these Creole revolutions
retained many of the territorial configurations as well as
many of the legal and cultural elements derived from the imperial
heritage of the European mother countries. Issues pertaining
to the pre and post-revolutionary existence of Aboriginal
rights, which were frequently recognized through treaties
in the process of obtaining from Indigenous peoples what Dorothy
Jones has described as a "license for empire, form a
particularly rich subject in the study of the genesis of sovereignty
in the so-called New World. (9)

Accordingly, the brief phrase, Aboriginal and treaty rights,
introduces a new expression to identify a number of old ideas
and issues whose central themes continue to converge in unfinished
cycles of colonization and decolonization. These cycles of
oppression and resistance were in no way terminated or severed
by the dismantling of most European empires after the Second
World War. Since the demise of Europe's formal empires, however,
it is agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, global corporations and the US military which seem in
the eyes of many to carry forward the contemporary outgrowths
of the imperial heritage that Kipling once labelled as the
White Man's Burden. All of these modern-day institutions project
forward into the twenty-first century the balance sheets of
assets and liabilities derived from an era when more classical
exercises of imperialism formed the primary basis of world
order. They carry forward the balance sheets of credit and
debt that were first calculated and apportioned in a time
when the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the dispossession
of Indigenous peoples on a global scale formed a vital element
in separating winners from the losers in the early genesis
of capitalism.
Many of the unfinished cycles of colonization and decolonization
are expressed in the awkward fit between around 200 nation
states and around 6,000 distinct language communities, the
vast majority of which are Aboriginally-rooted and locally-based.
All of the cultural diversity boiling in this tumultuous cauldron
of human organization is currently being blended into an increasingly
uniform strain of monocultural commercialization, a single,
all-embracing regime of economic relationships which can be
described as global capitalism. Given the current importance
of the United States as the primary symbol, heartland and
enforcer of this increasingly integrated and uniform regime
of global economic relations, I maintain that the study of
the treatment of the rights and titles of Indigenous peoples
in North America in the era of the Declaration of Independence
has much light to shed on a number of the tensions and dilemmas
facing humanity as we enter the twenty-first century. I argue,
for instance, that the treatment afforded Aboriginal and treaty
rights in the era of the founding of the United States helps
explain the rather concerted antagonism on the part of the
US government to any initiative that would see the world's
superpower subjected to the authority of any agency embodying
a jurisdictional claim higher than itself. This phenomenon
was dramatically illustrated in the lead-up, against massive
transnational protests, to the US-led attack on Iraq. In pushing
ahead with militarized "regime change" the government
of President George W. Bush, along with that of Tony Blair
in Great Britain, refused to adhere to the authority of the
UN Security Council, the sole agency on earth afforded the
international mandate to authorize legal warfare.
In the aftermath of the military occupation of their territory
the inhabitants of occupied Iraq found themselves in a position
of legal and political uncertainty that bares some comparison
with the constitutional twilight zone that engulfed Indigenous
peoples in North America once they and their Aboriginal lands
became subject to the control of the United States. Accordingly,
in looking for precedents to help clarify the legal and political
position of the diverse peoples of
occupied Iraq, one could do worse than to look at the treatment
afforded by the US government to Indigenous peoples whose
Aboriginal lands and resources provided the initial great
prize for making the revolutionary break with the imperial
proprietorship once claimed by Great Britain throughout much
of the North American.
A glance in this direction suggests the basis for a number
of questions arising from the occupation of Iraq by the United
States and Great Britain. Did, for instance, the US government
perceive that it was extinguishing the ancestral
title-- the Aboriginal title-- of the peoples of Iraq in the
course of the military takeover of their ancestral lands?
How was the legal title to the country, but particularly to
its oil resources, affected in the process of the US-led attack
and occupation? Will the doctrine of conquest eventually be
cited in explaining the imperative of the occupying power
in playing a decisive role in determining who can or cannot
represent the Iraqi people in their treaty-making relations
with the outside world? Will the doctrine of conquest be cited
in justifying the role of the US government in deciding the
eligibility of companies seeking contracts for the extraction
and export of Iraqi oil? (10)
Uncertainties such as these form only the tip of the iceberg
of repressed juridical questions in an era when most of the
pretences and pretensions of international law have been thoroughly
overwhelmed by the pre-eminence of a single superpower that
has acquired such massive influence in establishing the pecking
order of global power relations linking nationalities, peoples,
corporations, individuals, and governments. The process of
US expansion into Indian Country established many of the original
precedents and underlying assumptions on which the hierarchical
pecking order of the informal American empire continues to
be based, even as the frontiers of American power are extended
further into those extensive portions of the planet dominated
by Arab-speaking people and by the religion of Islam. The
Palestinians and the Kurds come to mind, for instance, as
groups whose treatment in the informal American empire is
most likely to remain more like that historically afforded
to Aboriginal groups within the United States than to Japan
and the countries of Western Europe over the course of the
process which saw their rebuilding and reconstitution after
the Second World War.
In the hectic days leading to the public release of the Declaration
of Independence on July 4, 1776, virtually all the passages
dealing with the role of the British parliament were removed
from the text. The revolutionary protagonists in
British North America remained hopeful, it seems, that they
would be able to maintain the friendship of some of the Whig
elements in the British government. They thus had good reason
to skirt many of the complex constitutional issues that might
transform potential allies in the mother country into foes.
Besides, it was far more manageable from a propaganda point
of view to personalize the looming conflict as one directed
at the alleged ruthlessness of a single, power-hungry tyrant.
This demonization of individuals to simplify and personalize
the reasons for going to war, it seems to me, has remained
integral to the psychology of American militarism ever since.
The most recent example of this phenomenon lies in the
way US officials and their media acolytes have exploited the
elaborate demonology constructed around Osama bin Laden and
Saddam Hussein. This demonology has helped officialdom evade
any serious grappling with the ideological complexities of
a global War on Terror led by a country born of the violent
overthrow of a duly constituted authority. In the aftermath
of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, it was made to
seem as if constant repetition and linkage of the names of
bin Laden and Hussein was a mantra of sufficient magical force
to replace the need for some systematic public reckoning with
the continuing cycles of global colonialism.
Colonialism's continuing cycles, as epitomized by the installation
and maintenance of local puppet regimes to oversee US-based
oil and gas interests in parts of Latin America, Western Africa,
Indonesia, and the Middle East, form key elements in the dynamics
of the ever-widening polarities of global inequality, a phenomenon
that some have characterized as global apartheid. (11) Any
hint that a more just distribution of economic and political
power might constitute the most potent antidote for the kind
of ruthless attacks that took place on the Pentagon and the
World Trade Centre has been quickly brushed aside by the American
government in theonslaught of machismo jingoism permeating
the so-called War on Terror.
In 1776 it was the alleged abuses of King George III that
were presented to world by the founders of the United States
as the primary justification for taking up arms against the
duly established authority vested in the imperial government
of British North America. King George, the founders of the
United States charged, "has plundered our seas, ravaged
our coasts burnt our towns and destroyed the lives of our
people." The British monarch, they alleged, "has
obstructed the administration of Justice.. erected a multitude
of new offices... [and] kept among us in times of peace standing
armies."
There were many distortions and misrepresentations involved
in making the King rather than the British parliament the
supreme enemy of those who sought to found the United States
of America through an act of violent revolution. King George,
for instance, was condemned personally for the terms of the
Quebec Act of 1774. As its name implies, the Quebec Act was
not a royal proclamation but rather legislation of the British
parliament. Among its many provisions, the Quebec Act enabled
Roman Catholics to hold public office and to retain their
more collectivist forms of land tenure in the seigneuries
that took form along the St. Lawrence River in the era of
New France. It also extended the boundaries of the province
of Quebec to reincorporate much of the old fur-trade hinterland
of Montreal, or, in other words, Canada. For this parliamentary
extension of widened jurisdictions and religious toleration
to the citizens and government of Quebec, King George was
charged in the final version of the Declaration of Independence
with "abolishing the free system of english laws in a
neighboring province, establishing therein arbitrary government
and enlarging its boundaries, so as to render it at once an
example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute
rule into these colonies."
Virtually all of the territory added to Quebec in the Quebec
Act was land which had been seized by the British imperial
government from the French imperial government in the course
of the Seven Years War. The transformation of the constitutional
status of much of the former New France into Quebec in 1774
added another element of controversy to a process which began
in 1763. In October of that year King George had "reserved"
in a Royal Proclamation a vast region in North America's interior
for the Indians "as their Hunting Grounds." Attending
the British monarch's designation of the largest part of a
vastly expanded British North America as an Indian reserve,
and implicitly as a fur-trade hinterland of the newly-conquered
metropolis of Montreal, was the proviso that no private person
could purchase lands directly from the Indians. The authority
to purchase the Aboriginal title from "the several Nations
or Tribes of Indians" with whom the monarch claimed a
direct "connection" was made the exclusive imperative
of the King and his royal heirs. "If at any Time any
of the said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said
Lands," proclaimed the King George using the royal we,
"the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name,
at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to
be held for the Purpose." (12)

In signing into law this one document, King George moved
to set the imperial government, and, indeed, his own person
as the embodiment of sovereign authority in the British Empire,
in a place of immense power in North America. With the advice
of Tory advisors, including Sir William Johnson, the founding
Superintendent of the Northern Division of the British Imperial
Indian Department, the King established himself as the principal
authority in charge of regulating the pace and form of the
westward expansion of the Anglo-American settlements. As the
sole agent capable of purchasing Aboriginal title from Indigenous
peoples, King George invested in himself and his royal heirs
the exclusive capacity to pass new districts from the shared
control of Indians and the imperial government to the ownership
of British subjects and to the jurisdiction of the local legislatures.
In making this power grab the King took advantage of a feature
of British imperial law which enabled the monarch to forego
on a one-time basis the principle of parliamentary supremacy.
At the moment when the imperial sovereignty of the British
Crown was being first formalized throughout a newly-obtained
realm of the British Empire, the largely unwritten British
constitution enabled the monarch to act unilaterally in setting
in place the framework of local governance.
In the aftermath of the formal peace treaty with the government
of France, King George III established the framework of Crown
sovereignty in an expanded British North America by adding
and outlining the new jurisdictions of East Florida, West
Florida, and Quebec. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 also set
in place a new regime for the British governance of the sugar
colony of Grenada. The largest and most novel form of jurisdiction
created by King George, however, was the Indian Hunting Ground
established in the watershed of the Great Lakes Lakes and
in the eastern half of the Mississippi Valley. Among the outcomes
was the imperial government's imposition of a fixed boundary
to limit the western expansion of the Anglo-American colonies.
That border ran along the height of land linking the peaks
of the Appalachain Mountains. The symbolism of this imposition
seemed to indicate that the British imperial government had
taken over from the French imperial government in allying
itself with the Indigenous peoples in the continent's interior
and with the mercantile interests of the Montreal fur trade.
King George and his Tory patronage network had seemingly moved
into the vacuum of power that the French sovereign had abandoned
in Canada, depriving the Anglo-American colonists of the territorial
spoils which many of them considered their rightful dessert
for having emerged victorious from the Seven years War. (13)
While the Declaration of Independence made specific reference
to the Quebec Act of 1774, that legislative instrument only
advanced and entrenched patterns of imperial governance that
originated in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The
Royal Proclamation of 1763 was hugely influential in creating
and widening the split among competing camps of British imperialists
that eventually exploded onto the stage of world history in
the form of the American Revolution. The idea of using British
imperial forces to defend Indians and French-Canadian fur
traders from the territorial acquisitions sought by land speculators
and Anglo-American pioneer farmers seemed truly intolerable
in many circles. The plan to tax the Anglo-American colonies
to pay the costs of an imperial military establishment, whose
function was to block Anglo-American expansion into Indian
Country, upped the ante of antagonism on the road to civil
war. (14) To Jefferson and those who rallied to the anti-monarchical
cause outlined in the Declaration of Independence, this imperial
scheme seemed nothing less than a violation of natural law
and a betrayal of common sense.

It is the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the political events
it helped set in motion that led to the final provision in
the Declaration of Independence's list detailing King George's
alleged crimes, infringements and misdemeanours. That provision,
which remained in tact with one small revision from the first
to the final draft of the world's most famous and consequential
political manifesto, alleged that King George "has endeavoured
to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless
Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished
destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions." In the
process of revision the three-word phrase, "conditions
of existence," was shortened. The words, "of existence,"
were removed to leave only "conditions." (15)
Francis Jennings has observed that the removal by Congress
of Jefferson's lengthy reference to slavery in an early draft
of the Declaration of Independence saved the document from
becoming "the laughingstock of Europe."(16) Significantly,
however, the inconsistency between a Declaration which, on
the one hand, proclaimed that "all men are created equal,"
even as it grouped all Indigenous peoples in North America
as "merciless Indian savages," has escaped much
public notice from 1776 until the present day. The provision
amounts to a seminal instance of racial profiling that clearly
excludes an entire category of humanity from the embrace of
the universal laws and liberties cited as the very reason
for bringing the United States of America into existence.
This excluded category of humanity is branded as being so
prone to unpredictable anarchism that it members can be counted
on to commit frequent acts of arbitrary violence against "all
ages, sexes and conditions." This imagined attribute
led the founders to exclude Indian people from those thought
to possess "certain inalienable rights," including
those of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
Indeed, to the authors of the Declaration of Independence,
it was apparently inconceivable that Indians, all of whom
they grouped together as "merciless savages," could
possess even the natural right of self-defence to protect
themselves, their families, their nations and their Aboriginal
lands against violent or even lethal encroachment.
This provision in the Declaration of Independence, it seems
to me, might well be conceived as one of the primary sources
setting basic orientations and precedents whose trajectory
through American history has helped to inform the philosophy
and methodology permeating the present War on Terror. The
champions and protagonists of this unorthodox campaign regularly
proclaim their assumed right to suspend the normal principles
of the rule of law, including those of due process, in favour
of the unilateral imperative to conduct "pre-emptive
strikes." Within this framework there are no set procedures,
no rules of evidence, to determine who is terrorist or who
might become one. Much as the authors of the Declaration of
Independence decided that they could unilaterally exclude
from universal rights and liberties those many Aboriginal
groups situated along "the road to happiness and glory"
that the United States would "climb" in its journey
from a republic, to transcontinental nation, to a global superpower,
so the determination of guilt or innocence in the War on Terror
has been left pretty much to the arbitrary determination of
the US government and its client regimes. This approach repeats
in a different context many of the patterns carried forward
in the Cold War, when the US government was left pretty much
unaccountable in making decisions to direct overt or covert
attacks at virtually any individual, organization, school,
party or government deemed inhospitable to, or unsupportive
of, the transnational operations of US-based enterprise.
Prominent among the modern-day descendants of the "merciless
Indian savages" referred to in the Declaration of Independence
are the "detainees" presently jailed in the US military
base at Guantanimo Bay in Cuba. Like scores of Indian people
imprisoned, and sometimes executed, in the course of the many
dozens of undeclared Indian wars that marked the westward
expansion of the United States, the Guantanimo Bay detainees
lie caged within the strange legal and physical constructions
of the so-called War on Terror. They are unable to gain access
to either the protections vested in the domestic criminal
law of the United States or in the international law of international
warfare.
New World Creoles versus Old World Imperialists and Aboriginal
Like the Quebec Act, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 had among
its objectives the goal of reconciling former enemies of the
British government in North America to live within the imperial
sphere of its influence and protection. Both instruments had
this affect. The ironic outcome was that the British Empire
retained the two main constituent parts of French-Aboriginal
Canada even as it lost the allegiance of the largest block
of English-speaking Protestants in British North America.
The role of French Canadians and of most Indigenous peoples
as friends and allies of the British Crown in the era of the
American Revolution resulted in the maintenance of northern
portion of British North America as a domain of imperial sovereignty.
The maintenance of this diminished base of Crown sovereignty
in North America provided a place of refuge to which many
of the United Empire Loyalists, including a number of former
slaves, fled from the thirteen rebellious colonies once these
polities were reconstituted to form the original United States.
The spirit and intent of the Quebec Act lives on in the form
of Canada's policies of official bilingualism. Similarly,
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 established patterns and precedents
of Crown negotiations with Indigenous peoples. These
cycles of negotiation were renewed in 1982 when Canada's constitution
was patriated with a provision recognizing and affirming the
existence of Aboriginal and treaty rights. (17) The rights
invested in the principles of Aboriginal title
continue to be recognized in the negotiation of modern-day
treaties with Indigenous peoples, most recently in the process
leading to the establishment in 1999 of Nunavut in the eastern
Arctic and to the entrenchment in British Columbia in 2001
of a regime of Nisga'a self-governance on an elaborately-outlined
basis of Nisga'a land and jurisdiction. (18)
As is most evident in the sometimes intense controversies
surrounding the ongoing negotiation of about fifty modern-day
treaties in British Columbia,(19) Canadians continue to grapple
in the twenty-first century with the political implications
of coming to terms with King George's stipulation that non-Aboriginal
privatization and exploitation of Aboriginal lands should
not be pressed forward without some accommodation of the principles
of Aboriginal and treaty rights.
In the British North America of 1776, however, the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 came to embody the essence of much of
what the would-be founders of the United States said they
wanted to change by breaking free from the British Empire.
Indeed, the document came to represent something of the thesis
that would generate the antithesis driving the revolutionary
movement to found a new sovereign polity in the Western Hemisphere.
More than any single enactment in the British governance of
eastern North America, the Royal Proclamation embodied the
principles of monarchical authority that the leadership on
the liberal side of the American Revolution seized upon in
their campaign to mobilize Anglo-American public opinion behind
them.
No where is the Royal Proclamation specifically referred
to in the Declaration of Independence, although its existence
was clearly integral to the allegation that King George had
"brought on" the "merciless Indian savages"
to do indiscriminate violence to the pioneer farmers on frontiers
of the Anglo-American settlements. The fact that a good deal
of this violence amounted to self-defence against the ruthless
and largely unregulated aggressions of Anglo-American expansionism
had no sway over the anti-Indian proclivities of the sworn
enemies of the British King.
In the prelude to the American Revolution the British sovereign
advanced Tory objectives by constructing an elaborate regime
of patronage appointments in the British Imperial Indian Department.
Its primary domain lay in the reserved
Indian Hunting Ground to the rear of the Thirteen Colonies.
The members of this most Tory branch of colonial administration
did indeed encourage Indigenous peoples to see the British
sovereign as their ally. They encouraged His Majesty's Indian
Allies to believe that the British head of state was committed
to protecting large tracts of Indian Country, along with the
mercantilistic commerce of the British North American fur
trade, from the illegal incursions of British subjects, their
corporate extensions and their local legislatures. (20) In
advising King George in 1768 about the work of imperial Indian
agents, the Lords of Trade stressed that these officials should
"act under your Majesty's immediate Authority; and which,
as they have reference to the general Interests of the Indians,
independent of their connection with any particular Colony,
cannot be provided for by the Provincial Laws." The tasks
of these North American Indian agents in the service of the
British Empire was to encourage "the renewal of antient
Compacts or Covenant-Chains made between the Crown and the
principle Tribes of Savages in that Country; the reconciling
of Differences and Disputes between one body of Indians and
another; the agreeing with them for the sale of surrender
of Lands for publick purposes not lying within the limits
of any particular Colony; and the holding of Interviews with
them for these and a variety of other general Purposes, which
are merely Objects of Negotiation between Your Majesty and
the Indians." (21)
The Royal Proclamation confirmed and advanced an old tendency
in the Americas for Indigenous peoples and imperial governments
to move towards alliances of various sorts in countering the
expanding claims of colonial populations. As
they sought wider powers and resource bases for themselves,
the transplanted populations from Europe attempted often to
indigenize their own identities even as they concurrently
sought to overpower and undermine those Aboriginal
groups that presented obstacles to the growth and edification
of their own Creole societies. "Creole" is a term
which first developed in Spanish America to identify the offspring
of immigrants who were born in the Americas. (22) Like Benedict
Anderson, I use the term here to identify the native-born
descendants in the Americas of emigrants from Europe, including
those who formed the majority populations of the primarily
Protestant and English-speaking colonies that confederated
to form the original United States of America.
The imperial authorities in charge of New Spain and New England
sometimes countered the muscle flexing of the indigenizing
Creoles by siding with the Indians, however weakly and sporadically.
In 1705, for instance, Queen Anne and her Privy Councillors
got directly involved in a dispute between colonial officials
in Connecticut and a group of Mohegan Indians. The English
sovereign intervened to introduce a fairer approach to litigation
and arbitration than the Connecticut courts were able to provide
with their biased local judiciary. (23) In the sporadic alliances
between Aboriginal Americans and European sovereigns, a powerful
symbol of which lay in the establishment by the imperial government
in New Spain of an office of the Protector of Indians,(24)
Christian missionaries sometimes acted as important intermediaries.
Many ironies permeated the attractions that from time to
time drew Indigenous peoples and imperial governments together
in the mix of interests all vying for control over the direction,
form and content of change in the Americas. Both
Indigenous peoples and European imperialists had good reason
to share a common hostility towards the push of the Creole
colonists for widened fields of autonomy. Both appreciated
the implications of the shared understandings that
tended to animate Creole visions of the future. These visions
were often founded in Creole desires to carve out new worlds
for themselves by simultaneously violating the legal, political
and ecological viability of the old world societies indigenous
to the Americas as well as the imperial authority of old world
Europe. Both old world imperialists and old world Aboriginals
had their own good reasons to fear and to oppose the revolutionary
make over of colonies by Creole populations, whose leading
members tended to be unusually preoccupied with aggrandizing
their own wealth, self-importance and latitude for fast, acquisitive
and unregulated frontier expansion.
The extreme manifestations of individualism that tended to
proliferate with the extension of the institution of private
property into the most fundamental structures of land tenure,
especially in the expanding Protestant realm of the Western
Hemisphere, proved especially corrosive to the reciprocal
bonds of both feudalism and Aboriginality in the Americas.
The forces that sometimes drew together European imperialists
and Indigenous peoples, however, went beyond a shared resistance
to the expansionary thrust of Creole independence movements.
The European and Aboriginal opponents of Creole rebelliousness
found common ground in forms of conservatism reflecting similar,
if not identical, attachments to the principle that titles
to territory and jurisdiction should be able to pass from
generation to generation in a fashion resistant to sharp breaks
in continuity. Moreover, the feudal traditions that that had
given rise to monarchical institutions in Europe shared some
attributes with the collectivist principles informing the
complex of ecological relationships linking Indigenous peoples
with the biodiversity of their Aboriginal bioregions.
The provision in the Declaration of Independence connecting
the alleged tyranny of King George to the alleged violence
of "the merciless Indian savages" marks a classic
expression of the relatively widespread trepidation animating
a number European immigrants and their Creole descendants
in most of the European colonies in the Western Hemisphere.
With the marked exception of the colonists of New France,
who depended collectively on friendly relations with Indians
because the strategic importance of the Canadian fur trade,
members of transplanted societies tended to fear getting caught
in the vice-like squeeze of existing or potential alliances
linking their natural frontier enemies, the Indigenous peoples,
with the sometimes autocratic rule of distant imperial governors.
The activism of Thomas Jefferson exemplifies many of the
most representative features of Creole identity politics.
In seeking to counter a developing alliance between the imperial
government and the Indigenous peoples on the frontiers of
the Anglo-American settlements, Thomas Jefferson developed
a particularly elaborate theory which he outlined at some
length for his fellow Virginians in a pamphlet he wrote in
1774. In A Summary of the Rights of British America set Forth
in Some Resolutions intended for the Inspection of the Present
Delegates of the People in Virginia Now in Convention, Jefferson
gave seminal articulation to many of the arguments that were
about to establish him as the principal ideologist on the
liberal side of the American Revolution. In his insightful
survey text entitled The American Indian in Western Legal
Thought, Robert A. Williams, Jr. has observed that "Jefferson's
Summary View was one of the most influential and popular pamphlets
published before the Revolution. In many ways, it can be seen
as a trial run for many of the core statements of American
political and legal discourse later elaborated by Jefferson
in the Declaration of Independence." (25)
In Summary View Jefferson presented a theory that the colonial
land owners in Virginia and other Anglo-American jurisdictions
were invested with a kind of Aboriginal title, which he described
as "Allodial title." Jefferson rooted this
claim in his view of America's pioneer settlers as the inheritors
of the traditions of liberty emanating from the Saxon pioneers
who had settled England in the distant past. "Our Saxon
ancestors," Jefferson wrote, "held their lands,
as
they did their personal property, in absolute dominion, disencumbered
with any superior, answering nearly to the nature of those
possessions which the Feudalists term Allodial." With
literary strokes such as these, Jefferson characterized the
time of Saxon hegemony in England as an inspirational golden
era when no higher authority sought to limit the personal
freedoms of the idealized group. As Jefferson saw it, this
unbounded freedom was rooted ultimately in unencumbered land
holdings flowing from Allodial rights. These Allodial rights
can be pictured as the deepest and most original source of
individualistic land tenure.
Having introduced this conception of unfettered Saxon liberty,
Jefferson went on to apply the concept of "the Norman
Yolk" to North American history. The concept of the Norman
Yolk, which had come to command quite wide authority on
both sides of the Atlantic, held that the Norman Conquest
of 1066 had resulted in the imposition of a number of alien
feudal principles on England. Among those alien principles,
argued Jefferson, was the feudal theory that all land holdings
were derived from the sovereign Crown. Jefferson pictured
the migration from England to America as being motivated in
part by the flight of oppressed Saxons seeking to escape the
impositions of a form of government alien to their own laws
and traditions. "America," he wrote, "was not
conquered by William the Norman, nor its lands surrendered
to him or any of his successors. Possessions there are undoubtedly
of the Allodial nature."
As in the Declaration of Independence, there are no specific
references in Jefferson's Summary View where the Royal Proclamation
of 1763 is specifically mentioned. Many of the main elements
of Jefferson's rhetorical onslaught, however, are clearly
aimed at blasting apart the principles outlined in King George's
seminal articulation of a theory of Aboriginal and treaty
rights. Attending these principles was the idea that the imperial
government was the proper authority to control the pace and
form of colonial expansion in British North America. The key
to this control was the power to distribute and legitimate
those land titles derived from the process of gradually transforming
portions of the vast Crown-Aboriginal Indian reserve into
Anglo-American settlements.
Jefferson's position that the land rights of colonists were
Allodial in origin-- in other words, that there were no deeper
Crown or Aboriginal sources underlying the existing or future
land titles of settlers in the Anglo-American settlers-- was
well calculated to confound King George's recognition that
Indigenous peoples possess an Aboriginal title in their Aboriginal
lands that cannot be transferred or extinguished without their
collective consent. Jefferson's invocation of the rights of
free Saxons was calculated to counter this equation, one that
linked Crown recognition of Aboriginal title to the assumed
power of the imperial government to control the development
of the land tenure system and the taxation system throughout
a vast British North American domain. In the aftermath of
the Seven years War this domain had incorporated both the
territory and most of the inhabitants of French-Aboriginal
Canada. In seeking to discredit the principles of the Royal
Proclamation, Jefferson's arguments in Summary View were pointed
against the reconstitution of the British Empire to accommodate
the rights, titles and interests of those merging societies
that had evolved on and around the middle ground of French-Aboriginal
Canada. (26) Most of all Jefferson opposed those features
of the Royal Proclamation and its extension in the Quebec
Act that were aimed at extending imperial power through the
sovereign's assertion of an exclusive jurisdiction to purchase
Aboriginal title from the inhabitants of the imperially-protected
Indian reserve.
In calling paradoxically on a very specific interpretation
of European history in the effort to indigenize the rights,
identity and laws of Anglo-American colonists, Jefferson's
pamphlet embodies a particularly good example of the intellectual
contortions that often characterized Creole independence movements.
According to Benedict Anderson, it was these movements that
provided the original seeds from which the phenomenon nationalism
subsequently grew. Jefferson's preoccupation with the locally-rooted
character of the constituency he sought to represent and to
lead is clearly demonstrated in the way he identified himself
on the title page of Summary View. There is no reference to
Jefferson by name. Instead the authorship is attributed simply
to "A NATIVE, AND MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES."
Jefferson's identification of himself as "A Native"
is entirely consistent with his interpretation of the Allodial
title of colonists as the deepest and most original form of
land tenure in America. It was entirely consistent with Jefferson's
assertion that "It is time therefore for us to lay this
matter before his majesty, and to declare that he has no right
to grant lands of himself. From the nature and purpose of
civil institutions, all the lands within the limits which
any particular society has circumscribed around itself, are
assumed by that society, and subject to their allotment only.
This may be done by themselves assembled collectively, or
by the legislature to whom they may have delegated sovereign
authority: and, if they are allotted in neither of these ways,
each individual of the society may appropriate to himself
such lands as he finds vacant, and occupancy will give him
title." (27)
This passage reflects especially well the deep influence
of political philosopher John Locke on the thinking of Thomas
Jefferson. Indeed, so prolifically did Jefferson borrow from
the work of Locke in the Declaration of Independence,
that Richard Lee of Virginia characterized the political manifesto
almost a plagarism. (28) Locke's Two Treatises of Government
gave strong intellectual backing, first to the Whig side that
emerged victorious from England's Glorious
Revolution and then, almost a century later, to those who
revolted against Great Britain with the goal of forging a
new sovereignty in North America. Locke's work was especially
popular with Jefferson's generation of Anglo-Americans
because it gave such clear and unqualified sanction to the
very process that many of them advanced in displacing Indigenous
peoples in order to to reconstitute their Aboriginal lands
as titled private property under the jurisdiction of their
own local legislatures. Locke had given sanction to this transformation,
writing, "For I ask whether in the wild woods and uncultivated
waste of America left to Nature, without any improvement,
tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres will yield the needy
and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences of life as ten
acres of equally fertile land doe in Devonshire where they
are well cultivated." The archetypal member of these
"needy and wretched inhabitants" Locke identified
as "the wild Indian who knows no Inclosure, and is still
a Tenant in Common." (29)
For Locke there was no human development, thus nothing resembling
an Aboriginal title or right to the lands of the Anglo-American
colonies, before the coming of the Europeans. "In the
beginning," he famously wrote, "all the world
was America, and more so than that is now, for no such thing
as Money was any where known."(30) Locke claimed the
status of an expert in formulating such commentary, wherein
Aboriginal America was made emblematic of humanity's beginnings
before history and money concurrently intervened to generate
both progress and destiny. As Secretary to the Earl of Shaftsbury,
a Lord Proprietor of Carolina, Locke was deeply involved in
the governance of the Anglo-American colonies in the era of
the Restoration. Through this involvement he became somewhat
familiar with much of the seventeenth-century literature of
Americana, including its rudimentary ethnography. (31)
Writing from this background, Locke referred often to North
American Indians to illustrate his theories in a genre of
political philosophy that made the protection of property
the central reason and ideal of human governance. (32)
In one of his most frequently-quoted passages, for instance,
Locke wrote, "This Law of reason makes the Deer, that
Indian's who hath killed it; 'tis allowed to be his property."
(33) >From this starting argument Locke proceeded down
a
chain of interconnected ideas which led to the conclusion,
so popular with Jefferson and his fellow revolutionaries,
that common property was transformed into private property
in America when individual colonists invested personal labour
in the agricultural improvement of land. Jefferson spun these
Lockean principles into his theory of Allodial title, an interpretation
meant to pre-empt the theory of Aboriginal title as outlined
in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
Locke's writings were extremely influential in helping to
cast in conceptual concrete the idea that all Indians in the
Americas were primarily hunters. This misrepresentation, still
prominent to this day, fails to take into account the
reality that the political economy of many Aboriginal societies
throughout the Western Hemisphere was based primarily on agriculture.
Indeed, at least half the crops that now form important staples
of global commercial agriculture, including, for instance,
corn, potatoes, coco, and tobacco, emerged long before 1492
from the ancient horticultural science of Aboriginal Americans.
(34) The notion that all Aboriginal people were hunters, and
that these hunters failed to utilize the lands of America
in the most productive and fruitful ways, underlay Jefferson's
contention that "each individual of the [colonial] society
may appropriate to himself such lands as he finds vacant,
and occupancy will give him title." This way of imagining
America as a terra nullius-- as "vacant" domain
where European immigrants and their descendants were unconstrained
by pre-existing Aboriginal rights (35)-- was essential in
the transformation of Locke's "wild Indians" into
the Declaration of Independence's "merciless Indian savages."
The demonization of all forms of Aboriginal resistance on
the frontiers of American conquest can be viewed as the future
superpower's first propaganda campaign to disguise its original
imperial expansions behind the cover of what might be described
in today's terms as a War on Terror.
Towards an International Regime of Protection for Aboriginal
and Treaty Rights
Throughout the era between the American evolution and the
Second World War, the Royal Proclamation seemingly disappeared
into the obscurity reserved for historical anachronisms. Throughout
this period Clarence Walworth Alvord was one of the few academics
to break the pattern by taking the document seriously. (36)
He was one of the professional scholars from the American
Mid-West who made careers in extending and elaborating the
frontier thesis that Frederick Jackson Turner had introduced
in Chicago at the world exposition celebrating the four-hundredth
anniversary of Christopher Columbus's "discovery"
of America. (37) In 1917 Alvord published a major, two-volume
work of American frontier history focusing on the role of
land speculators and their corporate extensions in the genesis
of the American Revolution. Many of those who speculated in
possible scenarios for the colonization and privatization
of frontier lands in America were politicians who, according
to Alvord, worked the trans-Atlantic axis of British imperial
relations. Prominent among them were George Washington, Benjamin
Franklin and the latter's great ally in the British government,
Lord Shelburne.(38)
One of the main challenges facing land speculators like Washington
and Franklin was to remove or circumvent the prohibitions
on the acquisition of portions of the Indian Hunting Ground
set aside by King George in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
In responding to this challenge the land speculators innovated
aggressively on new frontiers of the law and politics of corporate
formation. Their experiments in deriving private profit from
the activities of colonizing corporations, although largely
unsuccessful prior to the American Revolution, helped generate
the commercial pressure to create a new sovereign polity in
North America more attuned the desire of European immigrants
and their Creole descendants for rapid western expansion.
The pre-revolutionary activities of the land speculators,
who pushed the political frontiers of corporate law, anticipated
the enormous roles that private railway companies would play
in the transcontinental expansion of the United States in
the nineteenth century, or that the American oil and gas conglomerates
would play in the globalization of American interests in the
twentieth century. The deployment and expansion of the US
Armed Forces was instrumental in facilitating the activities
of both the railway companies and the oil and gas conglomerates.
To Alvord, the Tory mercantilists who opposed and obstructed
the expansionary schemes of the Anglo-American land speculators
in the prelude to the American Revolution were "visionless
politicians of the Old World." In flights of rhetoric
which sometimes approached Jeffersonian heights, the frontier
historian condemned the alleged backwardness of the men had
who lent their support to the complex of interests and ideologies
converging in the Canadian fur trade, the Royal Proclamation,
the Quebec Act and the more centralized yet flexible approach
to multiculturalism in the British Empire. These conservative
imperialists, Alvord argued, failed to understand "the
inexorable forces of natural law" as manifest in the
fulfillment of the "logic of history.... in the occupation
by the better endowed people of the territory so inadequately
utilized by the inferior race." (39)
Alvord's sympathetic concentration on the role of Anglo-American
land speculators and their corporate extensions in the early
genesis of the United States mirrors, edifies and celebrates
the spirit of Manifest Destiny that has long
inspired American expansionism. (40) Similarly, the Royal
Proclamation emerges in his study as the quintessential symbol
linking the imperial and Aboriginal impediments about to be
cleared away in the American Revolution. Although the term
was not popularized until the 1840s, Manifest Destiny can
be conceived as one of the most potent energies running through
the entire course of American history, from the Old Testament
impetus to constitute Puritan New England as a New Jerusalem
to the theocratic certainties permeating the militaristic
assertiveness of the so-called Bush Doctrine. This sense of
Manifest Destiny can be seen as both a hostile response to,
and a New World extension of, the older phenomenon of European
imperialism.
As a country that emerged from a revolt against imperial
rule, only to become "the West's" chief embodiment
and instrument of global domination, the United States has
been a child of paradox since its inception. Indeed, the most
consistent common denominators of American personality have
rested in the consistency of irony and paradox as central
attributes of national character. The expansionist urges of
Manifest Destiny, for instance, have long co-existed with
a profound sense of isolationism that has often influenced
the relationship of the United States and many of its citizens
to the rest of the world. The tension between American expansionism
and isolationism forms but one of the many contentions between
sharply contradictory forces that have energized the United
States as the premier impresario of creative illusion on the
Disneyfied frontiers of McWorld's political economy. The United
States was born as a hybrid combining the religious zealotry
of the Reformation and the secular rationality of the Enlightenment.
(41) It was born in the revolutionary tumult of a decolonization
movement whose armies of liberation went on to lead the charge
of an imperial ascent that today transcends even that of imperial
Rome. In the course of this rise the United States acted as
Europe's alter ego and its most outspoken critic, even as
it also doubled as Europe's as most lucrative land speculation,
as its most successful protege, and as a giant, big box amplifier
of some of the most noble achievements and spectacular failures
of the European people.
The ethos of irony and paradox that has urrounded the United
States since the era of its emergence from the British Empire
helps to explain how it is that the Royal Proclamation of
1763, a classic instrument of eighteenth-century
imperialism, should have acquired such relevance for the decolonization
movement, especially as it developed with the dismantling
of European empires after the Second World War. In the era
of the American Revolution the Royal Proclamation was perceived
by those who rallied behind the Declaration of Independence
as an unwarranted imperial imposition on the imperative of
Anglo-Americans to widen rapidly the extent of their settlements
and land holdings after the British conquest of New France
in the Seven Years War. For those on the Indian side of the
new boundary dividing the Anglo-American colonies from the
lands reserved to the Indians as their Hunting Grounds, however,
the document had very different implications. It outlined
a number of principles, however sketchily or imperfectly,
that constituted positive recognition that the rights and
titles of Indigenous peoples would receive some recognition
and protection within the variegated framework of an evolving
imperial law binding the multicultural mosaic of the British
Empire.
It would not be going too far, in fact, to characterize the
principles outlined in the Royal Proclamation as something
of a democratic breakthrough for Indigenous peoples in the
genesis of an international law of Aboriginal and treaty rights.
The codification of these principles in the constitutional
matrix of a changing British Empire extended some of the most
important egalitarian ideals of the European Enlightenment
to those facing double jeopardy on the receiving end not only
of European imperialism, but also of the most lethal forms
of Creole racism. The lethal extremes of Creole racism were
expressed in the crimes against humanity which accompanied
the western expansions of the United States. (42) The criminality
directed at the elimination and removal of Indigenous peoples
was both anticipated and sanctioned by the reference to merciless
Indian savages in the Declaration of Independence. When seen
in contrast to this provision, or to the Lockean and Jeffersonian
interpretations that supported it, the Royal Proclamation
takes on its fuller significance in
the gradual development of universal principles for something
approaching a global rule of law. The stipulation in the Royal
Proclamation that Indigenous peoples have the collective right
to give or withhold consent for any changes to the
legal status of their Aboriginal territories marked an especially
important step on the way towards the unrealized ideal of
a global regime of democratized protection for universal human
rights.
The Royal Proclamation derives much of its contemporary importance
from what it demonstrates about the usefulness of a number
of constitutional inheritances from European imperialism as
potential checks against the lawless incursions of American
Manifest Destiny. The provision in the Royal Proclamation
recognizing the right of Indigenous peoples to collective
roles in determining the future of their Aboriginal lands
illustrates that those on the liberal side of the American
Revolution had no monopoly on the process of infusing the
liberating force of Enlightenment idealism into the changing
configurations of global power. The position of King George
on the rights and titles of Indigenous peoples in the British
Empire marks a clear illustration that, on some matters, the
Tories were far in advance of the revolutionary forces in
charting a more progressive course towards fairer and more
sophisticated forms of social organization. The contrast is
especially telling when the progressiveness of the Royal Proclamation
is compared with the stunning backwardness of the Declaration
of Independence on the issue of Aboriginal and treaty rights.
This contrast speaks of the continuing relevance of Red Tory
movements, or, increasingly, Green Tory movements, whose proponents
often bring together trajectories of interests and ideas quite
at odds with the so-called conservatism of the Right in, for
instance, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
(43) In all of these outgrowths of British imperial colonization,
European immigrants and their Creole descendants have long
been in dominant positions. In all of these countries the
Right continues to attach the rhetoric of unfettered individualism
to the ideals of deregulation, privatization and expanded
autonomy for business corporations. This agenda is often mixed
with the strange contortions that continue to characterize
Creole identity politics. These contortions were on public
display in, for instance, the anti-Aboriginal, anti-immigrant
policies of the One Nation Party in Australia (44) or in the
Canadian Alliance Party's support for a provincial referendum
in British Columbia whose loaded questions signalled a clear
intent to harness majority opinion against the ongoing treaty
negotiations with First Nations. In Jefferson's time or our
own, Creole identity politics are often framed in opposition
to the principles of Aboriginal and treaty rights. The champions
of Aboriginal and treaty rights, in
turn, consistently favour the pre-eminence of central authority
over the decentralization implicit in the so-called states
rights or provincial rights movement.
As principles that invest the process of colonization and
globalization with some prohibitions on the complete vanquishment
of the weak by the strong, on the total extinguishment of
the old by the new, Aboriginal and treaty rights animate strategies
and actions aimed at correcting some of the most striking
inequities which have concentrated huge amounts of wealth
and power in the hands of a disproportionately entitled few.
While the membership in this most richly entitled minority
was once composed largely of European imperialism's biggest
beneficiaries, its more recent instruments of elite privilege
include the militarized interventions of American Manifest
Destiny, the transnational reach of global corporations and
the attending complex of national, international and supranational
financial agencies. Among these agencies are the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization,
institutions which help maintain the balance sheets of credit
and debt, assets and liabilities, derived from the time when
much of the world's capital was derived from the privatization
of human life through slavery and from the massive appropriation
of Aboriginal resources. This appropriation continues yet,
throughout, for instance, sections of the Canadian North or
the remaining rainforests of Amazonia. This transfer of wealth
from the Aboriginal world to that of the imperial, Creole
and corporate colonizers has often been advanced with legal,
moral, and political arguments stressing Lockean themes.
One mark of the growing effectiveness of the instruments
of elite privilege lies in the growing divide between rich
and poor. (45) One effect of this increasing polarization
has been to undermine and pre-empt the high-minded idealism
of the charter and many of the international instruments of
the United Nations. Most of these instruments are unequivocally
on the side of decolonization and against the blights of racism
and discrimination based on religion, nationality, and gender.
In the light of this support for decolonization from the world's
most representative and important international agency, how
is it that some legacies of European imperialism deserve deeper
integration into the juridical framework of twenty-first century
world order? How is it that an instrument such as the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 should be drawn upon in an era when the
formal possession of colonies by imperial powers has become,
with some few exceptions, essentially a thing of the past?
As I see it, the ethos of post-colonialism as displayed,
for instance, in the large and diverse range of national constituencies
represented at the United Nations, disguises deeper patterns
of top-down rule whose primary medium of imperial control
lies in the institutional framework of the global economy.
One of the clearest markers of the unfounded myth of post-colonialism,
I believe, lies in the easy sense of personal identification
with the plight of the Palestinians
of such a large and growing proportion of the earth's inhabitants.
The Palestinians are a people whose Aboriginal rights and
titles have very recently and very obviously been violated
and denied. As I see it, popular identification with the plight
of the Palestinians has become the global locus of a kind
of proxy enabling much of the world's population, but particularly
its most marginalized and dispossessed branches, to register
the conviction that colonialism continues as one of the dominant
forces of injustice. As demonstrated in the emphasis given
Palestinian rights by such a high proportion of the delegations
at the World Conference on Racism in Durban South Africa in
the summer of 2001, this preoccupation extends far beyond
the Arab-speaking domain to encompass a constituency that
is roughly contiguous with, although not xclusive to, those
regions where political independence is most tenuous and most
recent.
Accordingly, the easy identification of so many groups and
individuals with the struggle of the Palestinians for land
and self-determination serves to suggest that that there are
very few citizens of recent colonies who rest secure in the
feeling that they have achieved genuine liberation and independence
with the departure of their former imperial governors. The
mobilization of the global movement to restore Palestinian
rights has become, in a sense, a repository for
the conviction that imperialism never ended. This new imperialism
continues through largely the same means and agencies that
have rendered the United States as the world's sole superpower.
The convergence of the most extreme expressions of Christian
fundamentalism in the United States with the right-wing movement
in Israel to colonize with Jewish settlements the West Bank
of the Jordan River renews in the Middle East many of the
same controversies that once made the frontier between Indian
Country and the Anglo-American settlements such a conflicted
zone of revolutionary ferment. The contrasting positions of
the Royal Proclamation and the Declaration of Independence
on the rights and titles of Indigenous peoples suggests much
about the range of the political pressures bearing on both
Israelis and Palestinians of good will in their mutual quest
for compromise. This quest for compromise is taking place
on lands that are subject to overlapping claims of Aboriginal
title as marked in the close proximity of the ancient holy
shrines of the three Abrahamic religions.
The circumstances of the Cold War played a major role in
neutralizing, undermining, and sabotaging many of the most
liberating promises of the decolonization movement. The Cold
War provided the United States with a means of maintaining
its sense of exceptionalism and a means of expanding its expressions
of Manifest Destiny, even as the old colonial powers brought
their empires to an end during an era when the excesses of
Naziism had thoroughly discredited the Master Race fantasies
tainting most expressions of imperialism. While the original
menace for the emergent Americans was seen to lie in the alliance
of red Indians and King George's Red Coats, the new red scare
was generated by the real or imagined protagonists of the
international communist conspiracy. There are endless ironies
in how the imperialism of Europe was reconfigured after the
Second World War to assume the less formal structures of the
USA's global empire. The paradoxical nature of the original
Creole revolt in the Americas against imperial rule holds
one of the main keys to understanding how this reconfiguration
could have taken place.
The US sense of Manifest Destiny had developed originally
to justify the extinguishment or containment of Aboriginal
populations in North America as well as the displacement of
European imperialism by American hegemony throughout
much of the Western Hemisphere. While American Manifest Destiny
thus developed in opposition to European imperialism, it has
also perpetuated the continuity of an unbroken cycles of imperial
expansion that began when Christopher Columbus initiated the
modern era of globalization in 1492. That unbroken cycle of
imperialism continues to this day, in large measure through
the inequitable workings of the global economy. The conflagration
in Vietnam, where the imperial forces of the United States
replaced those of France, exemplifies how the Old World colonialism
of Europe was incrementally replaced by its New World extension.
The heavy resistance faced in Vietnam by the Armed Forces
of Japan, then France, and then the United States proved to
be not so much an expression of the stimulations, attractions,
and organizational prowess of international communism. This
most resolute and determined of the decolonization movements,
rather, proved to be more about the insistence of Indigenous
peoples in Vietnam that they would exercise and defend their
Aboriginal title to their own Aboriginal lands.
The demise of the Soviet Union after 1989 took away from
the United States the global enemy that had helped it maintain
and refine its worldwide fighting form after the Second World
War. The absence of a global enemy for the superpower, however,
proved short lived. The US response to the tragic events of
September 11 renewed many elements of America's Cold War psyche
and its sense of Manifest Destiny. The War on Terror is being
waged against the kind of diffuse, pervasive and ill-defined
enemy which is well suited to the continuity of a crusade
that goes back to the founding of the United States on principles
which included a jihad against "merciless Indian savages,
whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction
of all ages, sexes, and conditions." The replacement
of merciless Indian savages and Godless communists with the
menace embodied in a global network of infidel terrorists
provided the necessary enemy for the military assault of God's
Chosen People, of American Manifest Destiny, to continue.
It enabled the deployment of American fighting forces on the
most extended frontiers of American power. It enabled a continuing
conquest of evil along the journey to the promised land of
a New Jerusalem, a New Israel. This promised land of American
destiny can be pictured as the theocratic, military and commercial
heartland of a New World Order. In the tradition of Tom Paine,
George Bush Sr. seized on the idea of a New World Order to
describe the end of Cold War bipolarism and the commencement
of a unilateral approach to global governance as initiated
in 1991 with the first US-led invasion of Iraq by a UN coalition
of fighting forces.
The return by the leadership of the United States to some
of the imagery and themes of the American Revolution helps
call attention to the principles of the Royal Proclamation.
The Royal Proclamation provided an evocative symbol of the
invasiveness of British imperial rule. It became, in fact,
the thesis which engendered the antithesis given such consequential
and enduring articulation by Thomas Jefferson and others in
the Declaration of Independence. A return to the Royal Proclamation
and the principles of Aboriginal and treaty rights within
the framework of international law would help encourage the
superpower to engage in some reckoning with the Old World
realities of its own revolutionary origins. Moreover, the
application of the principles of Aboriginal title to processes
of international arbitration aimed at clarifying the juridical
status of, for instance, the Palestinians, the Iraqis, and
the Kurds, would help guide the course of global geopolitics
beneath the superficialities that presently limit the quality
of negotiation and debate in the arena of global geopolitics.
There is significant potential for enhancing the quality
of public debate over how globalization should proceed in
the twenty-first century in calling attention to the implications
of the contrast between the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and
the Declaration of Independence. While the latter remains
one of the best known contributions to the literary canon
of liberation struggles, the Royal Proclamation too is an
important foundational text with much relevance to the quest
to identify universal standards and principles in the elaboration
of a global rule of law. As no one could have fully appreciated
in 1763, the principles applied by King George to Indian groups
in an expanded British North America would have implications
in the years ahead for many hundreds of millions of Aboriginal
people, and many thousands of Aboriginal societies, in Asia,
in Africa, and in much of Latin America. Indeed, the position
of Indian peoples in North America would prove to be far more
representative of the conditions faced by the largest mass
of the world's population than the comparatively privileged
circumstances of Creole settlers in the Anglo-American colonies.
Like the Indians of North America, many of the Indigenous
peoples particularly in Africa and large parts of Asia would
see themselves and their Aboriginal lands become subject to
wave after wave of alien exercises of imperial domination.
The division at the end of the nineteenth century of most
of Africa south of the Sahara among Europe's imperial powers,
with virtually no input, let alone consent from region's Indigenous
peoples, illustrates the extreme biases of an international
system structured on the theory that all of humanity could
be starkly split between savagery and civilization. To be
placed on the savage side of this equation-- to be classified
among the "natives" who collectively made up the
largest part of humanity-- was to be put in a position of
grave disadvantage in the structures of a fragmented world
order that remain lodged to this day in the architecture of
global inequality. The Royal Proclamation established principles
and ideals which, had they been applied more widely and aggressively,
could have placed more substantial limits on the inroads and
presumptions of colonialism. The principles and ideals of
the Royal Proclamation could still be applied in advancing
the process of decolonization beyond the very rudimentary,
spotty, inequitable, and generally flawed beginnings that
were made in the years when European empires succumbed beneath
the weight of a global system retooled first by two superpowers,
and then by a single hyperpower.
The distance between King George and Thomas Jefferson on
the role to be afforded Indigenous peoples in the colonization
of North America epitomizes the pattern that has often seen
the proponents of wider jurisdiction for local
governments emerge as leading foes of Aboriginal and treaty
rights. Alternatively, the champions of more centralized regimes
of authority, whether applied within imperial, federal or
global frameworks, are more likely to continue the legacy
of King George in his effort to secure a recognized and entrenched
place for the First Nations in the territorial and jurisdictional
organization of British North America.
The process leading to the patriation of the Canadian constitution
provides a recent example of the same tensions that made different
positions on the rights and status of Indigenous peoples a
major point of contention in both the American Revolution
and in the continuation of the same struggle in the War of
1812. In the course of patriating the Canadian constitution
the provincial premiers of Canada's nine, predominantly English-speaking
provinces joined forces in November of 1981 in a failed attempt
to rip from the country's self-declared "supreme law"
the positive affirmation recognizing the existence of Aboriginal
and treaty rights. While the federal government temporarily
surrendered to this provincial assault on human rights and
the power of central authority, the federalists took back
the imperative of the central government as the defender of
Aboriginal and treaty rights when they insisted on the restoration,
in a slightly revised form, of section 35.
The issues raised by the Royal Proclamation point to the
irony that in order to maintain a basis of cultural pluralism
and ecological diversity on the planet, some universal, transnational
standards will have to be formulated and enforced
across a number of jurisdictional fields, including those
touching on Aboriginal and treaty rights. The edification
of a branch of the United Nations charged specifically with
responsibilities to formulate and enforce universal standards
in the exercise of the Aboriginal and treaty rights would
help set in place a new transnational instrument of central
authority capable of balancing the opposite tendencies of
local government. Those opposite tendencies frequently show
up in the propensity for state, provincial, or even national
authorities to conspire in efforts to incarcerate Aboriginal
and treaty rights within the narrow and often arbitrary constraints
of domestic law and politics. Worse yet, the inclination of
these officials is often to downplay or deny altogether the
role of their own governments in violating or extinguishing
Aboriginal rights. This saga of appropriation and annihilation
belongs at the centre rather than on the sidelines of world
history. As Mark Cocker has argued, for instance, "when
viewed as a single process the... consumption of tribal society
could be said to represent the greatest, most persistent act
of human destructiveness ever recorded."(46)
The problems of conflict of interest inherent in making national
governments and national courts responsible for judicial proceedings
involving allegations that their own officials engaged in
the commission of crimes against humanity, led
to the formulation and sporadic enforcement at the international
level of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide. This international instrument was ratified
by most member countries of the United
Nations in 1948, although the United States government didn't
sanction the Genocide Convention until 1989 when the Cold
War was coming to an end. The Genocide Convention can be seen
as one of the first steps in establishing a few universal
principles essential to the elaboration of a global rule of
law. The prohibition on genocide draws its universality from
the reality that virtually all human societies prohibit murder
in all but a very few situations. The process of systemizing
murder to eliminate whole classes of people seemed to call
for the conceptualization of a new category of crime going
beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of national governments
to involve instead the entire global community. The efforts
by the Nazis of Europe to automate on an industrial scale
the mass murder of Jews, and also of gypsies, homosexuals,
slavs and others, highlighted the need for new international
laws and procedures to arbitrate and punish such monumental
crimes against humanity.
Where the Genocide Convention build on universal prohibitions
outlawing murder, the Royal Proclamation advanced principles
reflecting relatively universal principles outlawing the crime
of theft. It advanced the notion that just as it is wrong
for one individual to steal another individual's property,
so is it wrong for one society to steal the collective property
of another society. Clearly this form of theft from entire
peoples, a genre of crime with genocidal consequences for
groups who thereby lose their collective means of economic
survival and cultural renewal, is one that has been re-enacted
again and again in the course of colonialism. The Royal Proclamation,
however, codifies the determination, situated at the very
core of what was in 1763 the world's most powerful imperial
regime, to balance the process of colonial expansion with
some legal protection for the collective property rights and
the collective rights of self-determination of Indigenous
peoples.
The need for the application of some of the Royal Proclamation's
principles to the most appropriative processes fuelling globalization
in its current form remains as real today today as it was
in North America in 1763. Indeed, almost
never does it happen that the Aboriginal titles of Indigenous
peoples are actively enforced when this variety of legal right
comes into conflict with the sovereign jurisdictions claimed
by national governments, state and provincial
governments, and their chartered extensions in the corporate
sector. In this respect the concept of some sort of equality
before the law has been virtually non-existent. As in pre-revolutionary
North America, the constitutional law of Aboriginal and treaty
rights is rarely, if ever, backed up with police power or
military force. Who has ever gone to prison for violating
an Aboriginal and treaty right in North America? On the other
hand, Aboriginal activists have been routinely criminalized
when they attempt to block the theft of what they see as their
own resources; when they attempt to stand on the jurisdictional
ground of Aboriginal and treaty rights as recognized, for
instance, by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and section 35
of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982. (47) This process
of criminalizing Indigenous peoples in the process of colonization
extends far beyond the conflicts involving contested interpretations
of jurisdiction over natural resources. In 1763 the Delaware
prophet, Neolin, was already warning his Indian followers
of Anglo-American abuses of the criminal justice system, arguing
"In their imprisoning you, they will destroy you."(48)
The Royal Proclamation is a seminal constitutional instrument
giving historical depth and continuity to a number of more
recent attempts to formulate international law primarily at
the United Nations. (49) It is connected, for instance, to
the Genocide Convention. The Genocide Convention represents
the dark element of a two-sided conception whose brighter
aspect is the positive affirmation of the right of all peoples
to self-determination. In order for a people to live, they
need more than the absence of mass murder. They need the means
to assemble, to make decisions among themselves, and the capacity
to the renew their shared identity through a variety of contemporary
institutions such as schools, broadcasting agencies, businesses,
and culturally-appropriate health-care and social services
agencies. This positive side of the equation is best embodied
in the affirmation that all peoples have an inherent right
of self-determination. (50)
In 1917 and 1918 President Woodrow Wilson of the United States
called for a reconstitution of world order based on the democratic
principle that all peoples, large or small, have the right
of self-determination. He issued this challenge
as part of a Fourteen Point strategy that he claimed formed
his basis for bringing the armed forces of his own country
into the First World War. His emphasis on the self-determination
of all peoples was calculated to present a liberal
alternative to the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the founders
of the Soviet Union. The first Soviet leader, Vladimir Illich
Lenin, had described imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism
in a pamphlet he issued on the eve of the Russian Revolution.
(51) Wilson's emphasis on the self-determination of peoples
was designed in part to pre-empt Lenin's condemnation of colonialism.
It was calculated to remind the world that the United States
was born in a revolt
against imperialism. Its purpose in entering the First World
War, claimed Wilson, was not to bolster the strength of one
empire over another. Rather it was to end the oppressiveness
of all empires.(52)
Wilson's idealism was quickly rejected within the United
States. That country opted not to enter the League of Nations,
the new institution meant to embody the Wilsonian vision of
a world order based not on the rule of force, but rather on
a global rule of law centred on a parliamentary democracy
of self-determining peoples. In failing to join the League
of Nations the United States retreated back to a preference
for lawless unilateralism that it had developed in its spurning
all efforts to internationalize issues pertaining to slavery,
racial segregation and maltreatment of Indigenous peoples
in the process of Euro-American expansion. This preference
for unilateralism would sporadically dominate US public opinion
and foreign policy until the present day. In the years immediately
following the cataclysm of the Second World War a new
window of opportunity opened for the idea of extending equality
rights beyond individuals to all peoples in a more democratized
global arena. The former US president's agenda was reflected
in the constitutional framework and legislative output of
the United Nations. In 1960, for instance, the UN General
Assembly carried forward many of the principles of the UN
Charter in sanctioning the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The opening
phrases of that Declaration, which were subsequently repeated
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, affirmed
1.All peoples have the right of self-determination; by virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of
their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any
obligations arising out of international economic co-operation,
based upon the principle of mutual benefit in international
law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means
of
subsistence.
Many of these principles of self-determination found earlier
and more rudimentary expression in the Royal Proclamation
of 1763. That instrument codified in the colonial law of British
North America the proposition that Indian peoples
should not be unilaterally deprived of their shared rights
of possession and jurisdiction in their Aboriginal lands.
While the Royal Proclamation's promise to protect the reserved
Indian Hunting Grounds was far from perfect, it did, nevertheless,
suggest a prohibition on the kind of lethal aggressions that
subsequent generations would label as genocide. Certainly
the Royal Proclamation's protections for Aboriginal rights
were a far cry from the virtual promotion of Indian fighting
in the Declaration of Independence with its reference to the
"undistinguished destruction" wrought by "merciless
Indian savages."
The imperial law of 1763 outlined very explicit procedures
for any purchase of Aboriginal title, stipulating that the
power to dispose of Aboriginal resources was vested somewhat
democratically in the collective decision-making authority
of Aboriginal groups. By specifying that the power to purchase
portions of the Crown-Aboriginal reserve in the heart of North
America belonged exclusively to the British imperial sovereign,
Indigenous peoples were encouraged to think of their transactions
with the monarch as genuine treaties negotiated on a nation-to-nation,
sovereign-to-sovereign basis. Hence the Royal Proclamation
was more in tune with the Wilsonian vision of a world order
based on the self-determination of all peoples rather than
with the Jeffersonian vision, one which excluded enslaved
Blacks and the Indigenous peoples of colonized territory from
the imagined framework of universal liberty.
Imperial Transformations Before and After the Royal Proclamation
of 1763
Those who drafted the Royal Proclamation drew on lessons
derived from a number of different colonial histories, but
particularly the Indian policies of New France and New Netherlands.
This pattern of incorporating earlier imperial
traditions from older colonies forms one of the most striking
features of British North American colonialism. In replicating
this strategy, one so vital to the successful expansionism
of its British imperial parent, the United States constructed
its own transcontinental empire. In the process of acquiring
territories, jurisdictions and powers from prior empires in
North America, the United States developed a range of imperial
techniques that it later extended and refined in a global
context. In this respect the informal empire of the United
States represents not so much a primitive, less evolved version
of the British Empire as Niall Ferguson has argued. Rather
the construction of the United States on the strategic foundations
of several prior European empires has rendered the superpower's
imperialism as a more developed and distilled version of the
earlier forms of colonialism which it absorbed and replaced.
Hence the founding of the United States should be pictured
more as an outgrowth than a negation of European imperialism.
The Declaration of Independence is a marker of this tendency.
It advanced an agenda for forms of expansion that were more
aggressive and less regulated than the approach outlined by
King George in the Royal Proclamation. The colonial history
of the United States supports this view of the superpower
as the largest outer shell of a Russian egg containing progressively
smaller and more internalized versions of imperialism. A century
before the transformation of New France into an expanded British
North America during the Seven Years War, for instance, the
English empire in
North America absorbed New Netherlands by transforming it
though conquest in 1664 into New York. In the years leading
up to New York's establishment, New Netherlands took over
the small colony of the New Swedish Company.
The United States carried on this ingestive, praying mantis-type
of ritual by devouring the imperial protein of the Spanish
empire in the Americas and the Pacific Rim. In applying the
Monroe Doctrine to Latin America, the US government infused
its influence into the space left vacant by the retreating
of power of Spain and Portugal. In 1848 the US government
continued this pattern in a military land grab of the northern
portion of the Mexican. The takeover of territory was formalized
in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. At the end of the nineteenth
century the United States continued this consumption of the
Spanish empire through the conquest of the Philippines and
Cuba in the Spanish American War. In 1803 the United States
purchased Louisiana from France and in 1867 it purchased Alaska
from Russia. The result is that the United States presently
sits on territory, portions of which were formerly claimed
by Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Russia and, of
course, Great Britain. The absorption of the North American
colonies of these European powers, each with its own Aboriginal
policy, proved to be something of a dress rehearsal for a
similar process after the Second World War. In ways that severely
limited the latitude available for the genuine decolonization,
but especially in the realm of economic relations, the United
States moved into the vacuum of power created by the final
dismantling of European empires, including that of the Soviet
Union.
This broader view of the genesis of the informal empire of
the United States gives enlarged meaning and significance
to the convergence of several older traditions of Aboriginal
policy in King George's recognition of Aboriginal and treaty
rights in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The core heritage
reflected and renewed in the Royal Proclamation is that of
the Covenant Chain. The Covenant Chain was an extremely elaborate,
intercultural diplomatic protocol that evolved over several
generations between a complex of Indian nations, with the
Longhouse League of Iroquoian-speaking peoples at their centre,
and a complex of Anglo-American colonies, with the the fur
traders and and leading colonial officials of colonial New
York at their lead. (53) The Covenant Chain extended some
of the ceremony and political philosophy of the confederacy
of peoples who referred to themselves, to their strategically-located
Aboriginal territory, and to their main seat of government
at Onondaga as the Haudonosaunee--the people of the extended
lodge-- of the Longhouse.(54)
The assimilative process of bringing European colonists into
Longhouse traditions began in the era when the settlers of
New Netherlands and New Sweden learned that developing sound
treaty relations with their Aboriginal neighbours
was good policy. Not only was it advantageous in opening doors
to the commercial and geopolitical benefits of participation
in the fur trade, but this means of obtaining a license for
colonialism from Indigenous peoples involved documented negotiations
and procedures that could be useful in providing legal arguments
to help fend off the competing claims of English interlopers.
The Indian policies of New Netherlands, as transmitted by
Dutch colonists to New York's English governors, affected
the genesis of the Covenant Chain beginning in the final years
of the seventeenth century.(55)
As it became increasingly clear in the era of the Seven Years
war that Indigenous peoples held the balance of power in the
conflict with imperial France, the Covenant Chain acquired
growing importance in the strategic calculations of the
British imperial military establishment in North America.
(56) Into this milieu stepped Sir William Johnson and his
Mohawk lover and confidant, Molly Brant. Together they attempted
to extend the intertwined power of the Longhouse
Confederacy, the Covenant Chain and the British Empire into
French-Aboriginal Canada. In advancing the ambitious imperial
designs of what Francis Jennings has called the ambiguous
Iroquois empire, Johnson directed a steady stream of information
and advice to the Lords of Trade and his other Tory friends
and colleagues in Great Britain. (57) His untiring promotion
of the strategic importance for the British Empire of Crown
recognition Aboriginal and treaty rights was instrumental
in shaping the content of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and
the course of British imperial Indian policy until the completion
of the War of 1812.(58)
The English absorption in 1664 of the colonial domain of
the Dutch West Indies Company became in some ways a model
for the absorption of Canada after the conquest of the French
Army on the Plains of Abraham in 1759. In both instances the
triumphant imperial force briefly toyed with the notion of
vanquishing the losers, but then relented with the determination
to integrate the older colonial systems into the workings
of the new regime. In the aftermath of the conquest of the
French imperial forces in North America, British forces moved
into the Great Lakes-Ohio Valley region where they briefly
conducted themselves as a conquering army. Their imperious
approach to colonial rule instigated a confederacy of Indian
peoples to resist by asserting military control over several
fur trade emporiums in the Interior. This Indian assertion
of their Aboriginal rights and titles was explained by an
Ojibway leader named Minavavana to Alexander Henry, an Ango-American
fur trader, in the following terms, "Englishman, although
you conquered the French, you have not yet conquered us! We
are not your slaves. These lakes, these woods and mountains
were left to us by our ancestors. They are our inheritance;
and we will part with none."(59)
News of the Indian resistance, which is most often associated
with the name of the Ottawa strategist, Pontiac, reached the
British capital in time to affect the content of the Royal
Proclamation. The Indian Confederacy's own patriotic stand
in opposition to the initial imposition of British rule in
the Great Lakes area had rung many alarm bells in the imperial
capital. The news of Pontiac's stand was widely interpreted
within the imperial cabinet as proof of the wisdom of extrapolating
the techniques of Indian diplomacy developed in the Covenant
Chain to wider horizons in an expanded British Empire. For
many years Sir William Johnson had been laying the analytical
foundations upon which this conclusion was ultimately reached.
The decision advanced in the Royal Proclamation to extend
the politics of the Covenant Chain to France's former Indian
allies entrenched Johnson's power as the great patriarch of
the northern division of the British Imperial Indian Department.
It strengthened the weight of his many recommendations that
the Indian policies of New France should be emulated in the
expansion of British North America. The French, Johnson declared
in one of his letters emphasizing the merits of what he saw
as a superior system of Indian administration, "would
never employ a Trader to negotiate any matters with the Indians
but a King's officer, who in whatever Rank or capacity is
attended by a retinue of Soldiers accordingly to denote his
importance."(60)
The desire to copy and replicate within the British Empire
the French system for the conduct of relations with Indigenous
peoples in North America is a well developed theme in the
official correspondence of imperial Britain. One of the
clearest expressions of this position was the report penned
for the Lords of Trade by Edmond Aitken, a Charleston-based
fur trader. His report in 1755 led almost immediately to the
creation of the British Imperial Indian Department as a arm
of the British Military Establishment in North America. Aitken
became Superintendent in the Department's southern division
whereas Johnson assumed the superintendency of the northern
division. The decision to centralize under
imperial control the administration of Indian Affairs was
based in large measure on Aitken's praise of the merits of
French colonialism in America. He wrote "It is universally
known, that the Indian [affairs] have been managed and conducted
on one plan, steadily pursued throughout Canada and Louisiana,
under the immediate direction of the Crown; the chief object
of which is, to exclude us not only from the Mississippi but
from all the Indian Nations on this side of it.
In execution whereof are employed Men of the greatest Knowledge
and Experience, by early and long Service, from among the
Officers and Missionaries; who are supported by the Trade
with the Indians, who rest their hopes of Preferment on their
own Behaviour, and who on all Occasions support the Honour
and the Dignity of the French Nation, and watch all opportunities
to turn every Occurrence to their own Advantage, or to the
Disadvantage of Great Britain and her Colonies."
Aitken advanced this analysis within the context of a broader
assessment emphasizing the importance of relations with Indigenous
peoples as a major determinant of the overall health and viability
of British colonialism in North America. This assessment was
one of the factors that gave the subject of Indian Affairs
such prominence in the minds of those who drafted the Royal
Proclamation. Aitken argued "The importance of Indians
is now generally known and understood. A Doubt remains not,
that the prosperity of Colonies on the Continent, will stand
or fall with our Interest and favour among them. While they
are our Friends, they are the Cheapest and Strongest Barrier
for the Protection of our Settlements; when Enemies, they
are capable by ravaging in their method of War, in spite of
all we can do, to render those Possessions almost useless."(61)
By way of comparison with the French imperial system, Aitkin
outlined what he saw as the disorganized malaise plaguing
the checkered Indian policies of the Anglo-American colonies
as long as local priorities prevailed. He asserted "Some
of the colonies have no regulations at all in Indian Affairs;
others have made different ones, and some but seldom if at
all send proper persons to look into them. But the management
of them hath often been left to Traders, who have no skill
in Public Affairs, are directed by their own interests, and
being generally the loosest kind of People, are despis'd and
held in great Contempt by the Indians as Liars, and Persons
regarding nothing but their own Gain."
This aspect of Edmond Aitken's report presents a small glimpse
the complex history beneath the explanation in the Royal Proclamation
of the provision prohibiting private purchases of Indian lands.
King George declared, "Whereas Great Frauds and Abuses
have been committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians, to
the Great Prejudice of our Interests, and to the Great Dissatisfaction
of the said Indians; In order, therefore, to prevent such
Irregularities in the future, and to the End that the Indians
may be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution
to remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent, We do, with
the Advice of our Privy Council strictly enjoin and require,
that no private Person do presume to make any Purchase from
the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said Indians....."
The great frauds and abuses referred to by King George went
far beyond the machinations of a hand full of self-interested
Anglo-American fur traders. A major source of uncertainty
in Anglo-American colonization before 1763 was the lack of
a clear and consistent set of conventions for acquiring Indian
lands. While exterminating the Aboriginal inhabitants of a
region constituted one means of clearing the Original title,
private purchases of Indian lands formed another, less drastic
strategy of acquisition. As long as there were no clear and
consistent procedures for such transfers, however, chaos tended
to prevail. It frequently happened, for instance, that the
same parcel of territory was claimed by two or more parties
based on different purchases from different groups of Indians.
There was simply no guarantee that an Indian group prepared
to sell a certain plot was the Indian group in fullest possession
of the territory in question. Moreover, it happened that some
Indian groups were perfectly happy to sell the lands of their
Aboriginal enemies, and more than once if possible.
One outcome of this unregulated approach to colonial expansion
on the frontiers of Indian Country was marked by worsening
cycles of violence and recrimination. It also resulted in
many trans-Atlantic visits to the imperial capital by a growing
number of delegations representing increasingly complex and
varied coalitions of colonial and Aboriginal interests. Many
of these delegations sought the intervention of the imperial
government as the ultimate arbiter in a proliferating array
of land disputes. The famous imperial test case entitled Mohegan
versus Connecticut first arose in the early eighteenth century
as an outgrowth of what Francis Jennings has dubbed "the
deed game." (62) Collectively this genre of dispute became
a legal and political quagmire. The provisions in the Royal
Proclamation calling for the implementation of a single, consistent
set of rules and procedures for the acquisition of Indian
lands addressed an old imperial problem that had bedeviled
relations among colonists even as it had helped drive many
Indian groups into alliance with the French. Moreover, it
removed the basis for future arguments based on the premise
that direct purchases from Indian groups by private individuals
or corporations placed the buyer inside the legal jurisdiction
of the Aboriginal sellers. Only by making the sovereign the
purchaser could it be made clear that jurisdiction as well
as title was changing hands.
The Royal Proclamation drew also on traditions of treaty
relations linking Quaker settlers with the peoples indigenous
to the colony founded by "the Great Proprietor,"
William Penn. Prominent among the treaty allies of the Quakers
were some groups of Lenni Lape, who were also referred to
as Delaware on account of the name attached to the river running
through their Aboriginal territory. (63) The tradition of
Quaker diplomacy in Indian Country was rooted in a number
of factors, not the least of which was the authentic conviction
held by the most sage members of the Society of Friends that
the Christian ideals of fairness and brotherly love demanded
that the English colonization in North America should be accompanied
by compensation to, and consent from, the continent's Aboriginal
inhabitants.(64)
The Quaker influence was most direct in the the negotiation
in 1758 of the Treaty of Easton, an agreement that elaborated
one of the core principles which the Royal Proclamation further
codified. In that transaction Sir William Johnson called on
Quaker leader, Israel Pemberton, to help bring together the
parties. The central provision of the Easton Treaty established
a fixed boundary line between the Anglo-American colonies
and the reserved Indian Hunting Ground. The success of that
negotiation helped shift the tide of the Seven Years War.
The promise of British officials to prohibit unregulated Anglo-American
land grabs in the upper reaches of the Ohio Valley helped
pull away Aboriginal groups in the region from their long
tradition of alliance with the French. The outcome was the
British takeover without a battle of the French post of Fort
Duquesne. It then was named Fort Pitt and subsequently Pittsburg.(65)
Legal historian John Borrows has pointed to a major Crown-Aboriginal
gathering which took place at Niagara in 1764 as evidence
that the terms of the Royal Proclamation were not unilaterally
imposed but subject rather to negotiations between a number
of First Nations and imperial officials, including Sir William
Johnson. As Borrows sees it, wider knowledge of what transpired
at Niagara "would go a long way to dispelling notions
that regard First Nations as subservient to or dependent upon
the Crown in pressing and preserving their rights." It
would help advance the appreciation of Indigenous peoples
"as active participants in the formulation and ratification
of their rights."(66)
At the Niagara council the Royal Proclamation was discussed
through translators expert in English and several Aboriginal
languages. The main ideas to emerge from the exchange were,
according to Borrows, the idea of an Indian relationship with
the imperial power based on peace and friendship, alliances
with the Crown, free trade, and the necessity of Aboriginal
consent for any cession of the protected Indian territories.
The principles of relationship outlined in the assembly were
marked on a famous wampum delivered to the Crown's Indian
allies by Sir William Johnson. In that era many of the most
important transcultural transactions in the Indian Affairs
of eastern North America were signified and preserved in pictoral
representations beaded into shelled belts known as wampums.
The history of the dissemination of wampum and the protocols
accompanying this medium of diplomacy are closely associated
with the links of continuity connecting the expanding spheres
of influence radiating first from the Longhouse League, then
from the Covenant Chain and then from the Indian Confederacy
that eventually defended Canada from annexation by the United
States in the War of 1812. The adoption of wampum in the Indian
diplomacy of the Swedish, the Dutch, the French, the Anglo-American
colonies, the British imperial regime and the US government
is evidence of the influence of Aboriginal culture and laws
on the culture and laws of the colonizing societies in North
America. It is evidence of the progress of an ideal demanding
reciprocity and compromise from all sides on the middle ground
between those who envisioned America as a New World and those
grounded in the knowledge of the Western Hemisphere as the
site of many Old Worlds. In today's terms this ideal of reciprocal
compromise might be described as Aboriginal and treaty rights.
After the American Revolution the United States was organized
on principles that elevated the role of central authority
by putting the federal government firmly in control of the
process of western expansion. A key to this distribution of
powers was to centralize jurisdiction over the conduct of
war or over the negotiation of treaties with Indigenous peoples.
In making this adjustment, one that helped orient the national
government of the United States to its continental, hemispheric
and global role in empire building, many of the principles
animating the Royal Proclamation of 1763 were reproduced within
the context of American independence.
Many of the powers once claimed by King George, for instance,
were taken over by Congress in 1787 in a legislative enactment
entitled the Northwest Ordinance. The Northwest Ordinance
laid out the framework for the organization of lands north
of the Ohio River and South of the Great Lakes as an internal
colony of federal jurisdiction. This legislative instrument,
one which created the prototype for many federal territories
yet to come in the expansion of both the United States and
Canada, proclaimed,
"Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and
the means of education shall forever be encouraged. The utmost
good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their
land and property shall never be taken from them without their
consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty, they
shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful
wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and
humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs
being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship
with them."(67)
The language employed in the Northwest Ordinance is a far
cry from the reference in the Declaration of Independence
to "merciless Indian savages." This change in tone
can be interpreted as an outgrowth of the success of the American
War of Independence. With this success came a broadened willingness
on the part the Creole victors to integrate into the international
system controlled by the small circle of imperial powers which
had recognized the sovereignty of the United States in the
Treaty of Paris of 1783. The enactment of the Northwest Ordinance
seemed to signal to this imperial constituency that the federal
government of the United States was ready to continue the
civilizational mission of western Europe in colonizing the
Western Hemisphere. It seemed to signal that the United States
was assuming its responsibilities as both outgrowth and instrument
of Western Civilization; as both outgrowth and instrument
of the Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman heritage.
The Northwest Ordinance seemed calculated to impress on the
international community that the United States would treat
Indian peoples in North America fairly. The document's drafters
seemed less concerned, however, with putting forward such
reassurances in terms likely to persuade Indigenous peoples
themselves of the federal government's good intentions. With
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 the opposite seems to have
been the case. The imperial document seems inspired by a genuine
desire to persuade Indian peoples that they could survive
and thrive within the British Empire. It seems to have been
drafted with the hope of persuading Indian peoples of the
imperial government's "determined Resolve" to bring
them "Justice" through the protection of Aboriginal
land rights. Like the Royal Proclamation, the Northwest Ordinance
stipulated that Indian consent should accompany the process
of western expansion. Unlike the Royal Proclamation, however,
the Northwest Ordinance laid out a scheme of "lawful
wars... founded in justice" as an alternative means of
imposing non-Aboriginal jurisdiction on Indian peoples and
their Aboriginal lands. Given that Congress would act as the
sole arbiter of the lawfulness and justice of its own frontier
wars, this provision essentially reserved the right of conquest
as a means of nation building.
Between the American Revolution and 1871 the US government
entered into almost four hundred treaties with Indian nations
in the process of western expansion. (68) Often treaty negotiations
did not occur until the US Army had demonstrated the superiority
of its military strength through acts of conquest.
Unlike the Indian treaties negotiated in what remained of
British North America according to the Royal Proclamation's
terms, Indian treaties in the United States were afforded
the same treatment given treaties with foreign powers. To
become law they had to be approved in Congress by a two-thirds
plurality of votes in the Senate.(69)
A severe break in the continuity of the treaty system of
the United States occurred in the 1830s. Under the presidency
of Andrew Jackson, Congress passed laws calling for the relocation
of all Indian groups east of the Mississippi to new homes
west of the Mississippi. The implementation of a policy of
Indian removal on this scale violated virtually all of the
Indian treaties conducted up until that time with the US government.
Nevertheless, the scheme was pressed forward even in the face
of a decision of the Supreme Court clarifying the illegality
of Jacksonian Indian removal. The episode culminated in the
so-called Trail of Tears, the most dramatic of the forced
removals of the Cherokee and other members of the so-called
Five Civilized Tribes from their home territory in the American
Southeast.(70)
The treaty system going back to the Royal Proclamation of
1763 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was terminated in
1871 with an act of Congress. The congressional enactment
stated, "no Indian nation or tribe within the territory
of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as
an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United
States may contract by treaty." (71) This legislation
represented not only a retreat away from a tradition of domestic
law within the United States. It also represented a move away
from the nascent international law of Aboriginal and treaty
rights. It represented a move away from multilateralism towards
the unilateralism that would become such a dominant theme
in US foreign policy at the beginning of the twenty-first
century. Hence there were many global implications in the
retreat by the future superpower from the rule of law towards
a doctrine preoccupied with the manipulation of force. As
John R. Wunder has written, "The Resolution of 1871 not
only represented an end to pretense in Indian relations, but
it also meant a serious modification and violation of international
law and a threat to the diplomacy of the United States."(72)
In 1987 the US government clarified its dependence on the
doctrine of conquest, a justification for power that essentially
makes the rule of force superior to the rule of law. That
clarification came in the form of a reply from the U.S. State
Department to the United Nations Human Rights Commission.
The State Department was responding to a complaint brought
forward by Hopi traditionalists. Like some of the key activists
among the Western Shoshone and Six Nations peoples, Hopi people
have been among the most active intervenors in venues of international
law. (73) In answering the Hopi complaint, the executive branch
of the American government declared, "conquest renders
the tribes subject to the legislative powers of the United
States and in substance, terminates the external powers of
the sovereignty of the tribe." (74)
The shift from consent to conquest as the formal way of explaining
the relationship of power between Indigenous peoples and the
US government is consistent with an approach which has seen
the United States favour the rule of force over the rule of
law across many fields of human affairs. One need only invoke
the names of Hiroshima or Nagasaki to illustrate the American
propensity to favour conquest-- the principle that might is
right-- as the ultimate determinant of how world order should
be constructed. The importance of capital punishment and of
long jail sentences for a large proportion of the American
citizenry offer further evidence of the growing dependence
in the United States on state force and state coercion as
bastions of social cohesion. At the same time the resistance
to gun control in the United States is indicative of a widely-held
attitude within the superpower that legitimacy is ultimatley
derived from weapons rather than ballots, legislatures, statutes
and courts.
This emphasis on the rule of force over the rule of law expresses
very well the Darwinian conviction that the progress of society,
but particularly capitalist society, is based on a perpetual
struggle for survival where the fittest triumph and the where
the weak fall away through vanquishment, death and obsolescence.
The outcome of this attitude is evident in forms of global
organization that afford worldwide market relations far wider
latitude than the United Nations or international human rights
law in establishing the institutional configurations of human
relationships on a global basis. The outcome of this attitude
lies in a sytem of world order that makes monopoly capitalism,
as dominated by a few dozen of the world's largest corporations,
the basis on which the very broad outlines of global governance
are ultimately founded. In the prelude to the US-led invasion
of Iraq there developed a huge transnational protest registering
vast global antagonism towards this approach, one which vests
final authority over world order in the war making capacity
of the US military-industrial complex rather than in the constitutional
framework and law making capacity of the United Nations.
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 underlies to this day the
continuing negotiation of treaties between Indigenous peoples
and the sovereign Crown of Canada. One of the reasons the
law of Aboriginal and treaty rights has remained more integral
to the federalism of Canada than the federalism of the United
States is that the former's imperial constitution lies deeply
implanted in the culture, history and law of the fur trade.
That fur trade was one of the few commercial activities in
the colonization of the Western Hemisphere that provided a
basis for economic and political collaboration between Indigenous
peoples and newcomers. So elaborate did this collaboration
become in North America that the Indian Confederacy and the
British Army formed an alliance that ultimately prevented
Canada from being annexed by the United States in the War
of 1812. As Supreme Court Justice Samuel Henry Strong wrote
in a minority opinion on the St. Catherine's Milling case,
litigation between the Dominion and Ontario governments that
unfolded between 1885 and 1888, (75) the Royal Proclamation
led to a dramatic reduction of frontier conflicts for British
North Americans. "Indian nations," he wrote, "from
that time became and have since continued to be firm and faithful
allies of the Crown and have rendered it important military
service in two wars-- the war of the Revolution and that of
1812."(76)
The Royal Proclamation's tradition of Crown recognition of
Aboriginal and treaty rights was briefly submerged as a operational
factor in Canada's development between 1929 and 1973. In 1929
the making of the eleven numbered treaties came to a close
with a ceremony marking the adhesion at Big Trout Lake Ontario
of a group of Oji-Cree people to Treaty 9. Treaty 1 was negotiated
in 1871, the very year that Congress retreated from further
adherance to the international law of Aboriginal and treaty
rights. In 1973 the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the
concept of Aboriginal title as one belonging to Crown law
in British Columbia and, by implication, throughout much of
the rest of the Commonwealth as well. One result was the negotiation
of a number of modern-day Crown-Aboriginal treaties in Canada
beginning in 1975 with the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement.
A similar dynamic was set in motion in Australia in 1992,
when the High Court's Mabo ruling raised the pressure to bring
that country more in line with the international law of Aboriginal
and treaty rights.
The intensifying controversies engulfing Israel, Palestine,
Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran and many other hot spots on the contested
frontiers of the informal empire of the United States help
to increase the need to clarify the international status of
Indigenous peoples, but particularly those peoples living
in nation-states which are indifferent, or actively hostile
to their rights of self-determination. No longer is it acceptable
to dismiss such claims by falling back on old distinctions
drawn, for instance, in the Declaration of Independence between
merciless savages and those entitled to participate in the
universal liberties of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
In facing the tensions between its current role as the world's
sole superpower and its history of Indian fighting and empire
building within North America, the US government might not
yet have escaped the constitutional aura cast by King George
III. There may be future chapters of American history to write
about how the superpower comes to terms with the legacy of
Thomas Jefferson's imperial nemisis, the law giver behind
the principles of Aboriginal and treaty rights as seminally
codified in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
Endnotes
1.This paper draws from and extends arguments outlined at
greater length in The American Empire and the Fourth World.
The text, part one of a larger project entitled The Bowl With
One Spoon, is being published this fall by McGill-Queen's
University Press. ISBN 0-7735 2332-4
2.John Adams to Thomas Jefferson cited in Carl Becker, The
Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political
Ideas (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 135
3.See Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration
of Independence (New York: Knopf, 1997)
4.Carl Becker, The Declaration of Independence, pp. 147-150
5.Gregg Easterbrook, "American Power Moves Beyond the
Mere Super," The New York Times, 27 April, 2003, section
4, pp. 1, 5
6.See Richard W. Alstyne, The Rising American Empire (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1965); Francis Jennings, The Creation of
America through Revolution to Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000)
7.Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the
Modern World, 1700-200 (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp.
390-425; Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World
Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books,
2002); "The Empire Slinks Back," The New York Times
Magazine, 27 April, 2003, pp. 52-57
8.Hall, "What Are We? Chopped Liver?" in Michael
D. Behiels, ed., The Meech Lake Primer: Conflicting Views
of the 1987 Constitutional Accord (Ottawa:University of Ottawa
Press, 1989), pp. 423-456
9.Dorothy V. Jones, License for Empire: Colonialism by Treaty
in Early America
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982)
10.Timothy O'Brien, "Just What Does America Want To
Do With Iraq's Oil?," The New York Times, 8 June, 2003,
section 4, p. 5
11.Timothy O'Brien, "Just What Does America Want To
Do With Iraq's Oil?," The New York Times, 8 June, 2003,
section 4, p. 5
12.The Royal Proclamation of 1763 cited in Native Rights
in Canada. Second Edition, Peter Cumming et. Al., eds, (Toronto:
The Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada and General Publishing,
1972), p. 291
13.Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and
the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New
York: Vintage Books, 2000)
14.Jack M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle
West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775 (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1961)
15..Carl L. Becker, The Declaration of Independence, p. 180
16.Francis Jennings, The Creation of America, p. 170
17.See Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in
Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Diversity
(Vancouver, UBC Press, 1997)
18.For the background of these contemporary treaty negotiations
in British Columbia see Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and
Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990);Tom
Molloy with Donald Ward, The World Is Our Witness: The Historic
Journey of the Nisga'a into Canada (Calgary: Fifth House,
2000)
19.Christopher McKee, Treaty Talks in British Columbia: Negotiating
a Mutually Beneficial Future (Vancouver, UBC Press, 1996)
20.See Robert S. Allen, His Majesty's Indian Allies: British
Indian Policy in Defence of Canada, 1774-1815 (Toronto: Dundurn
Press, 1992)
21.Representatives of the Lords of Trade on the State of
Indian Affairs, 7 March, 1768, To the King's Most Excellent
Majesty, in Clarence Alvord and Clarence Edwin Carter, eds,
Trade and Politics, 1767-1769. Collections of the
Illinois State Historical Library, Vol. 16, British Series,
Vol. 3 (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1921),
p. 190
22.See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections
on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. Revised Edition
(London: Verso, 1991)
23.J.H. Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council from the American
Plantations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), pp.
417-441; Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies
of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France, c.
1500-c.1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 138
24.Charles R. Cutter, The Protector de Indios in Colonial
New Mexico, 1659-1821 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1986)
25.Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western
Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990), p. 255
26.See Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires,
and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press,
1991); Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's Heroic
Age Reconsidered (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1985)
27.Thomas Jefferson, A Summary of the Rights of British America
set Forth in Some Resolutions intended for the Inspection
of the Present Delegates of the People in Virginia Now in
Convention ((Williamsburg: Clementinarind, 1774),
reprinted in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd,
ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), Vol. 1,
1760-1776, pp. 132-133
28.Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western
Legal Thought, p. 246
29.John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1690, republished
in Two Treatises of Government: A Critical Edition with an
Introduction and Apparatatus Criticus by Peter Laslett. Revised
Edition (New York: Mentor, 1965), pp. 336,
328
30.Ibid, 343
31.James Tully, "The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights,"
in Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts
(Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 140-141
32.Crawford Brough Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962)
33.John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, p. 331
34.R. Douglkas Hurt, Indian Agriculture In America (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1987); Carl O. Sauer, Seeds, Spades
and Herds: The
Domestication of Animals and Foodstuffs (Cambridge Mass.:
The MIT Press, 1972); Betty Fussell, The Story of Corn: The
Myths and History, the Culture and Agriculture, the Art and
Science of America's Quintessential Crop (New
York: North Point Press, 1992)
35.See Boyce Richardson, The People of Terra Nullius: Betrayal
and Rebirth in Aboriginal Canada (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre,
1993)
36.Solon J. Buck, "Clarence Walworth Alvord, Historian,"
The Missississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 15, no.
3, December, 1928, pp. 309-320
37.Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the
Frontier in American History," first published in 1893,
reprinted in The Frontier in Perspective, Walker D. Wyman
and Clifton B. Kroeber, eds, (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press,1965); Walter Prescott Webb, "The Frontier Thesis
and the 400 Year Boom," in The Turner Thesis, Concerning
the Role of the Frontier in American History (Lexington Mass.:
Heath and Company, 1972)
38.See Clarence Walworth Alvord, "Lord Shelburne and
the Founding of British-American Goodwill," Annjual Raleigh
Lecture in History, Proceedings oof the British Academy, 1924-25,
p. 384
39.Clarence Walworth Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British
Politics: A Study in Trade, Land Speculation, and Experiments
in Imperialism Culminating in the American Revolution. 2 Vols.
(Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1917)
40.Albert K. Weinber, Manifest Destiny: A Study in Nationalist
Expansion in American History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1935); Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins
of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1981)
41.Conor Cruise O'Brien, On the Eve of the Millenium (Toronto:
Anansi, 1994), pp. 3-64
42.Ward Churchill, A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust
and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to present (Winnipeg: Arbeiter
Ring Publishing, 1998); Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The
Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire Building
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Richard
Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the
American Frontier, 1600-1800 (Middleton Conn.: Wesleyan University
Press, 1973); Slotkin, The Fatal Environment: The Myth of
the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1800-1890 (New
York: Atheneum, 1985); Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth
of the Frontier in Twentieth-First Century America, (New York:
Atheneum, 1992)
43 George Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian
Nationalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965); David
Orchard, The Fight for Canada:Four Centuries of Resistance
to American Expansionism, (Toronto: Stoddart,1993)
44.John Pilger, "Secret Waters," in Pilger, Hidden
Agendas (London: Vantage, 1999), pp. 223-248
45.Bruce R. Scott, "The Great Divide in the Global Village,
Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2000
46.Mark Crocker, Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe's
Conquest of Indigenous Peoples (New York: Grove Press, 1998),
p. xiii
47.Hall, "Treaties, Trains, and Troubled National Dreams:
Reflections on the Indian Summer in Northern Ontario, 1990,"
in Law, Society, and the State: Essays in Modern Legal History,
Louis A. Knafla and Susan W.S. Binnie, eds.,(Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1995), pp. 290-320; Sidney L. Harring, White
Man's Law: Native People in Nineteenth-Century Canadian Jurisprudence
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), pp. 273-281
48.Neolin cited in Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians,
Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815,
p. 284
49.See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in Internationa
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)
50.Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal
Appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
51.V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism:
A Popular Outline (1916;Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966)
52.Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy,
1917-1918, New York: Vintage Books, 1970); Victor S. Mamatey,
The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957)
53.Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Nations of
Canada, Which Are Dependent on the Province of New-York in
America, and Are the Barrier Between the English and the French
in That Part of the World, 2 Vols (London:
T. Osborne, 1747)
54.Lewis Henry Morgan, League of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee or
Iroquois (Rochester New York, 1851)
55.Francis Jennings, "Dutch and Swedish Indian Policies,"
in Handbook of North American Indians, William C. Sturtevant.
ed., Vol. 4, History of Indian-White Relations, Wilcomb E.
Washbirn, vol. Ed., (Washington: Smithsonian Institution,
1988), pp. 13-19
56.Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies
and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1988)
57.Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant
Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with British Colonies
from Its Beginning to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1984)
58.Sir William Johnson, The Papers of Sir William Johnson,
James Sullivan et. al., eds., 15 Vols., (Albany: University
of the State of New York, 1921 1965)
59.Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures in Canada and
the Indian Territories between 1760 and 1776 (Edmonton:Hurtig,
1969), pp. 44-45
60.Johnson cited in Timothy J. Shannon, "Dressing for
Success on the Mohawk Frontier: Hendrick, William Johnson
and Indian Fashion, William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series,
Vol. 53, no. 1, January, 1996, p. 40
61.Edmond Aitken, The Appalachian Indian Frontier. The Edmond
Aitken Report and Plan of 1755 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1967), pp. 3-8
62.Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism,
and the Cant of Conquest (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), pp.
128-145
63.See Anthony F.C. Wallace, Teedyuscung: King of the Delawares,
1700 1763 (Salem N.H.: Ayer, 1984)
64.Samuel M. Janney, The Life of William Penn, (Freeport
N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970) originally oublished
in 1851, pp. 164-170, 185 186; Edward C.O. Beatty, William
Penn as Social Philosopher, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1939), pp. 266-273
65.Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune, pp. 369-404
66.John Borrows, "Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation,
Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government," in Michael
Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada, p. 171
67.Northwest Ordinance, 1787, from Albert L. Hurtado and
Peter Iverson, eds. Major Problems in American Indian History:
Documents and Essays (Lexington Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company,
1994), pp. 168-169
68.Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History
of a Political Anomoly, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994); Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and
Treaties, 5 Vols., (Washington D.C. Government Printing Office,
1903-1941)
69..Hayden Ralston, The Senate and Treaties, 1789-1817: The
Development of the Treaty-Making Functions of the United States
during Their Formative Period, (New York: Macmillan Company,
1920)
70.Angie Debo, And Still The Waters Run: The Betrayal of
the Five Civilized Tribes (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1940)
71..Cited in John R. Wunder, "No More Treaties: The
Resolution of 1871 and the Alteration of Indian Rights to
Their Homelands," in Wunder, ed., Working The Range:
Essays on the History of Western Land Management and the Environment,
(Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 39
72.Ibid, p. 53
73.See Alexander Ewen, ed., Voice of Indigenous Peoples:
Native People Address the United Nations, (Sante Fe: Clear
Light Publishers, 1994); Lydia van de Fliert, ed., Indigenous
Peoples and International Organizations, (Nottingham England:
Spokesman, 1994)
74.United Nations Document E/CN.4/GR.1987/7/Add.1230, September,
1987, pp. 18-19, cited in Frank Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice
in World Politics: Since Time Immemorial, (Newbury Park: Sage
Publications, 1993), p. 58
75.Hall, "The St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company
versus the Queen: Indian Land Rights as a factor in Federal-Provincial
Relations in Nineteenth-Century Canada," in Aboriginal
Resource Use in Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects, Kerry
Abel and Jean Friesen, eds, (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba
Press, 1991), pp. 267-286
76.Reports of the Supreme Court of Canada, Vol. 13, pp. 609-610
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